mirror of
https://github.com/Elysola/WebHooker.git
synced 2026-11-21 01:23:40 +00:00
fix(webhook): confirm only accepted deliveries
Acknowledging before queue acceptance permanently loses deliveries. Confirm only accepted work, release failed claims, scope replay identities and strip tenant-supplied installation authority.
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@@ -2,9 +2,28 @@ import type { Env, WebhookEvent } from "../../types";
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import type { Provider } from "../types";
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import { hmacSha256Hex, timingSafeEqual } from "../hmac";
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import { verifySignature } from "../github/verify";
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import { claimOnce, idempotencyStore } from "../../lib/idempotency";
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const REPLAY_WINDOW_SECONDS = 300;
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const NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;
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/** How long an accepted nonce is remembered (longer than the signature window). */
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export const NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;
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/**
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* How long a nonce stays held while its request is processed. Short, so a
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* request whose attempt failed (and could not give the nonce back) can be
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* retried well within the signature window.
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*/
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export const NONCE_CLAIM_SECONDS = 120;
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/**
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* The request cannot be judged now: its nonce is held by an attempt not
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* confirmed as accepted (still running, or failed without giving the nonce
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* back), or the nonce store is unavailable. Not a proven replay: retry later.
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*/
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export class ReplayPendingError extends Error {
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constructor(message = "Replay nonce is held by an unconfirmed attempt") {
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super(message);
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}
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}
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function parseTimestamp(value: string | undefined): number | null {
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if (!value) return null;
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@@ -17,14 +36,18 @@ function parseTimestamp(value: string | undefined): number | null {
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* (Unix seconds) and `X-WebHooker-Nonce` and signs
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* `timestamp + "." + nonce + "." + body` instead of the bare body. We reject
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* timestamps outside a ±5min window and reject any nonce already seen (nonces
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* live in KV for 10min). Senders without those headers keep the legacy
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* are kept for 10min). Senders without those headers keep the legacy
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* body-only signature so existing integrations continue to work.
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*
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* Nonces are scoped to the signing secret, so two tenants picking the same
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* nonce never block each other, and claimed atomically (D1 when available),
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* so two concurrent replays cannot both pass.
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*/
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async function verifyReplayProtected(
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body: string,
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headers: Record<string, string>,
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secret: string,
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kv: KVNamespace,
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env: Env,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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const timestamp = parseTimestamp(headers["x-webhooker-timestamp"]);
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const nonce = headers["x-webhooker-nonce"];
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@@ -37,11 +60,23 @@ async function verifyReplayProtected(
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const expected = `sha256=${await hmacSha256Hex(secret, `${timestamp}.${nonce}.${body}`)}`;
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if (!timingSafeEqual(signature ?? "", expected)) return false;
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const nonceKey = `nonce:${nonce}`;
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const seen = await kv.get(nonceKey);
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if (seen !== null && seen !== undefined) return false;
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await kv.put(nonceKey, "1", { expirationTtl: NONCE_TTL_SECONDS });
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return true;
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const key = await replayNonceKey(secret, nonce);
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let state;
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try {
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state = await claimOnce(idempotencyStore(env.DB, env.KV), key, NONCE_CLAIM_SECONDS);
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} catch {
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// A storage failure says nothing about the signature.
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throw new ReplayPendingError("Replay protection is temporarily unavailable");
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}
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// Only a nonce whose request was accepted makes this a replay.
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if (state === "pending") throw new ReplayPendingError();
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return state === "claimed";
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}
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/** Claim key of a replay-protection nonce, scoped to the signing secret. */
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export async function replayNonceKey(secret: string, nonce: string): Promise<string> {
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const scope = (await hmacSha256Hex(secret, "webhooker:nonce-scope")).slice(0, 16);
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return `nonce:${scope}:${nonce}`;
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}
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/**
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@@ -72,7 +107,7 @@ export const customProvider: Provider = {
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headers["x-webhooker-timestamp"] !== undefined &&
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headers["x-webhooker-nonce"] !== undefined
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) {
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return verifyReplayProtected(body, headers, secret, env.KV);
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return verifyReplayProtected(body, headers, secret, env);
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}
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return verifySignature(body, headers["x-webhooker-signature"], secret);
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},
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@@ -80,7 +115,9 @@ export const customProvider: Provider = {
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parse(body, _headers): WebhookEvent | null {
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try {
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const payload = JSON.parse(body) as Record<string, unknown>;
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if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object") return null;
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// An object only: a top-level array (or scalar) could not be parked and
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// restored like every other payload, so it is refused up front.
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if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) return null;
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// Optional id for sender-side dedup (retries from monitoring systems).
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const deliveryId =
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typeof payload.deliveryId === "string" && payload.deliveryId
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+322
-86
@@ -1,22 +1,46 @@
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import type { H3Event } from "h3";
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import { getHeader, readRawBody, setResponseStatus } from "h3";
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import type { Env } from "./types";
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import type { Env, Group } from "./types";
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import { detectProvider } from "./providers";
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import { dispatchEvent } from "./core/dispatch";
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import { loadConfig, initConfigStore } from "./config";
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import { loadGroups, ensureInstallationGroup } from "./web/groups";
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import { loadConfigSnapshot, loadGroupFresh, initConfigStore } from "./config";
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import { ensureInstallationGroup } from "./web/groups";
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import { getTenantSecret } from "./web/tenants";
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import { NONCE_TTL_SECONDS, ReplayPendingError, replayNonceKey } from "./providers/custom";
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import { recordAudit } from "./lib/audit";
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import { cfEnv, cfWaitUntil, headersFrom } from "./cf";
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import { log } from "./lib/log";
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import { deliveryKey, idempotencyStore } from "./lib/idempotency";
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import { claimOnce, confirmClaim, deliveryKey, idempotencyStore } from "./lib/idempotency";
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import { newCorrelationId } from "./lib/correlation";
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import { enqueueWebhook, type DeliveryMessage } from "./queue/delivery";
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import {
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deliveryStateKey,
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enqueueWebhook,
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hadPermanentFailure,
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isRetryableFailure,
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markTargetsDone,
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targetDoneChecker,
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type DeliveryMessage,
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} from "./queue/delivery";
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const MAX_BODY_SIZE = 1024 * 1024;
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/** How long a delivery's dedup claim lasts when it is queued. */
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const QUEUED_CLAIM_SECONDS = 120;
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/** How long it lasts for an inline dispatch, which may run for minutes. */
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const INLINE_CLAIM_SECONDS = 600;
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/** An installation's auto-provisioning is remembered as long as delivery state (7 days). */
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const PROVISIONED_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 86400;
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/** Sending time of one inline dispatch: within its claim, with a margin. */
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const INLINE_SEND_BUDGET_MS = 8 * 60_000;
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/** Result of an inline dispatch: whether the sender should retry. */
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interface InlineOutcome {
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retry: boolean;
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/** A target failed for good (in this or an earlier attempt). */
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failed: boolean;
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}
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export interface WebhookResult {
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status: 200 | 400 | 401 | 404 | 413;
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status: 200 | 400 | 401 | 404 | 413 | 503;
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body: unknown;
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}
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@@ -27,6 +51,10 @@ export interface WebhookResult {
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* `POST /webhook/{groupId}`) the group's own secret is used for verification
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* (GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET are overridden per request) and
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* only that group's routes are eligible.
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*
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* A tenant-signed payload is only as trustworthy as the tenant: its claimed
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* GitHub App installation is dropped, so it can neither borrow the operator's
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* App credentials nor provision or rebind installation groups.
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*/
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export async function processWebhook(
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env: Env,
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@@ -38,30 +66,39 @@ export async function processWebhook(
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const requestId = newCorrelationId();
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let effectiveEnv = env;
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initConfigStore(env);
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const groups = await loadGroups(env.KV);
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// Until the request is verified, nothing but the receiving group's own row
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// is read (fresh): an unsigned flood must not read the whole configuration
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// each time. The full snapshot is read once the event is accepted.
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const provider = detectProvider(headers);
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if (!provider) {
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return { status: 400, body: { error: "Unknown webhook provider" } };
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}
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let tenant: Group | undefined;
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if (tenantId) {
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if (!groups.some((g) => g.id === tenantId)) {
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const found = await loadGroupFresh(env, tenantId);
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if (!found.group) {
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// Unreadable is not missing: the sender is asked to retry.
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if (found.unreadable) {
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return { status: 503, body: { error: "Group configuration unreadable; retry later" } };
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}
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return { status: 404, body: { error: "Group not found" } };
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}
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const secret = await getTenantSecret(
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env.KV,
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groups.find((g) => g.id === tenantId)!,
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);
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tenant = found.group;
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const secret = await getTenantSecret(env.KV, tenant);
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if (!secret) {
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return { status: 404, body: { error: "Webhook disabled for this group" } };
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}
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effectiveEnv = { ...env, GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET: secret, GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET: secret };
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}
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const provider = detectProvider(headers);
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if (!provider) {
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return { status: 400, body: { error: "Unknown webhook provider" } };
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}
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let verified = false;
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try {
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verified = await provider.verify(body, headers, effectiveEnv);
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof ReplayPendingError) {
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// The nonce is held by an attempt not (yet) accepted: not a replay.
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return { status: 503, body: { error: "Request is already being processed; retry later" } };
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}
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// A malformed secret or an unavailable crypto implementation must fail as
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// a clean 401, never an uncaught 500.
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log.warn(
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@@ -88,82 +125,281 @@ export async function processWebhook(
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return { status: 401, body: { error: "Invalid signature" } };
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}
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const event = provider.parse(body, headers);
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if (!event) {
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return { status: 400, body: { error: "Invalid event" } };
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// From here on, one-time claims are held (the custom-webhook nonce taken
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// by `verify`, the delivery dedup key). Only once the event is accepted
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// (queued, or dispatched without a transient failure) are they confirmed;
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// otherwise they are given back, so the sender's retry is not refused. A
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// claim that could not be given back is never mistaken for an accepted
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// event: a retry finds it unconfirmed and is asked to come back later.
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const claims = idempotencyStore(env.DB, env.KV);
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const held: { key: string; ttl: number }[] = [];
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const nonce = headers["x-webhooker-nonce"];
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if (provider.id === "custom" && nonce && headers["x-webhooker-timestamp"]) {
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held.push({
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key: await replayNonceKey(effectiveEnv.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET, nonce),
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ttl: NONCE_TTL_SECONDS,
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});
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}
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// Auto-provision GitHub App installations so tenant isolation is configured
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// without manual id entry: a group is created (or existing matching groups
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// are bound) before the event is dispatched.
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if (
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provider.id === "github" &&
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event.event === "installation" &&
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event.payload.action === "created" &&
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event.installationId != null
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) {
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const install = event.payload.installation as { account?: { login?: string } } | undefined;
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const account = install?.account?.login ?? "";
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try {
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const group = await ensureInstallationGroup(env.KV, event.installationId, account);
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if (group) {
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await recordAudit(env.DB, {
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ts: Date.now(),
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actorLogin: account || undefined,
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action: "installation.created",
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targetType: "group",
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targetId: group.id,
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groupId: group.id,
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});
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}
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} catch (err) {
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log.warn(
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{ err, installationId: event.installationId },
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"Failed to auto-provision installation group",
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);
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const releaseClaims = async (): Promise<void> => {
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for (const { key } of held.splice(0)) {
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await claims.release(key).catch((err: unknown) => {
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log.warn({ requestId, key, err }, "Failed to release a webhook claim");
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});
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}
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}
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};
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const confirmClaims = async (): Promise<void> => {
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for (const { key, ttl } of held.splice(0)) {
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// Unconfirmed, a claim only delays a duplicate until it expires.
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await confirmClaim(claims, key, ttl).catch((err: unknown) => {
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log.warn({ requestId, key, err }, "Failed to confirm a webhook claim");
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});
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}
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};
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const retryLater = (error: string): WebhookResult => ({
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status: 503,
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body: { error, requestId },
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});
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try {
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const event = provider.parse(body, headers);
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if (!event) {
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await releaseClaims();
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return { status: 400, body: { error: "Invalid event" } };
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}
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if (tenantId) event.installationId = undefined;
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if (event.deliveryId) {
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// Dedup via the idempotency store: a provider/tenant-scoped key means
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// different accounts may reuse a delivery id without colliding, while
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// retries of the same delivery never dispatch twice.
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const store = idempotencyStore(env.DB, env.KV);
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const key = deliveryKey(provider.id, tenantId, event.deliveryId);
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if (!(await store.claim(key, 120))) {
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return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, duplicate: true, requestId } };
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// retries of the same delivery never dispatch twice. An inline dispatch
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// holds its claim for as long as it may run.
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// A custom sender's ids are namespaced (`d:`) as its delivery identity is
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// below: no id it picks can take the key of a nonce-identified request.
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const dedupKey = event.deliveryId
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? deliveryKey(
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provider.id,
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tenantId,
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provider.id === "custom" ? `d:${event.deliveryId}` : event.deliveryId,
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tenant?.instance,
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)
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: null;
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if (dedupKey) {
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const ttl = env.QUEUE ? QUEUED_CLAIM_SECONDS : INLINE_CLAIM_SECONDS;
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const state = await claimOnce(claims, dedupKey, ttl);
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if (state === "done") {
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// Already accepted: this request's own nonce is used up as well.
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await confirmClaims();
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return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, duplicate: true, requestId } };
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}
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if (state === "pending") {
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// Still in flight elsewhere, or left over from an attempt that was
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// not accepted: the event may not be on its way yet.
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await releaseClaims();
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return retryLater("Delivery is already being processed; retry later");
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}
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held.push({ key: dedupKey, ttl });
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}
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// Provisioning runs only for an event not yet accepted (a duplicate
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// returned above): a redelivery must not redo a binding an admin undid.
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// Auto-provision GitHub App installations so tenant isolation is
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// configured without manual id entry: a group is created (or existing
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// matching groups are bound) before the event is dispatched. Only events
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// signed with the operator's own secret (the global endpoint) may do this.
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if (
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!tenantId &&
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provider.id === "github" &&
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event.event === "installation" &&
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event.payload.action === "created" &&
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event.installationId != null
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) {
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const install = event.payload.installation as { account?: { login?: string } } | undefined;
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const account = install?.account?.login ?? "";
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// Done once per installation, on record as long as delivery state is
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// kept: a redelivery after the dedup claim lapsed (minutes) must not
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// redo a binding an admin undid since. Recorded only once it succeeded,
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// so a provisioning that failed midway is completed by the retry.
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const doneKey = `installation-provisioned:${event.installationId}`;
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try {
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if (!(await claims.has(doneKey))) {
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const group = await ensureInstallationGroup(
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env.KV,
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event.installationId,
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account,
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env.DB,
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);
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await claims.claim(doneKey, PROVISIONED_TTL_SECONDS);
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if (group) {
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await recordAudit(env.DB, {
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ts: Date.now(),
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actorLogin: account || undefined,
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action: "installation.created",
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targetType: "group",
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targetId: group.id,
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groupId: group.id,
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groupInstance: group.instance,
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});
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}
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}
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} catch (err) {
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// Not accepted: the consumer never provisions, so a sender retry is
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// the only way the group gets created (provisioning is idempotent).
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log.warn(
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{ err, installationId: event.installationId },
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"Failed to auto-provision installation group",
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);
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await releaseClaims();
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return retryLater("Installation provisioning failed; retry later");
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}
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}
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// A stable identity across the sender's retries: the delivery id, else the
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// replay-protection nonce of a signed request. Queued or inline, it keys
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// the delivery's state and target ledger, so a retry of a request whose
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// first attempt went through after all is recognized, not sent again.
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// A custom sender picks its delivery ids freely: they get a namespace of
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// their own, so none can coincide with a nonce-derived identity.
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const nonceKey = held.find((h) => h.key.startsWith("nonce:"))?.key;
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const identity =
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event.deliveryId != null
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? provider.id === "custom"
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? `d:${event.deliveryId}`
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: event.deliveryId
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: nonceKey
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? `n:${nonceKey}`
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: undefined;
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// Inline, a request identified by its nonce alone is held for the whole
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// dispatch, as a delivery id is above: its nonce claim is short (shorter
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// than a long dispatch), and a copy arriving meanwhile must not send the
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// targets not yet on the ledger a second time.
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if (!env.QUEUE && event.deliveryId == null && identity) {
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const key = deliveryKey(provider.id, tenantId, identity, tenant?.instance);
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const state = await claimOnce(claims, key, INLINE_CLAIM_SECONDS);
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if (state === "done") {
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await confirmClaims();
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return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, duplicate: true, requestId } };
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}
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if (state === "pending") {
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await releaseClaims();
|
||||
return retryLater("Delivery is already being processed; retry later");
|
||||
}
|
||||
held.push({ key, ttl: INLINE_CLAIM_SECONDS });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (env.QUEUE) {
|
||||
const message: DeliveryMessage = {
|
||||
deliveryId: identity ?? requestId,
|
||||
groupId: tenantId,
|
||||
groupInstance: tenant?.instance,
|
||||
provider: provider.id,
|
||||
event: event.event,
|
||||
payload: event.payload,
|
||||
installationId: event.installationId,
|
||||
receivedAt: Date.now(),
|
||||
requestId,
|
||||
stateVersion: 2,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Acknowledge only once the event is durably queued.
|
||||
await enqueueWebhook(env, message);
|
||||
await confirmClaims();
|
||||
return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, requestId } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inline dispatch (no queue): there is no durable retry, so the sender
|
||||
// is answered only after the dispatch, and asked to retry while a target
|
||||
// failed transiently. A delivery id gets a target ledger, so targets
|
||||
// already sent are skipped when the sender redelivers.
|
||||
// One consistent snapshot of routes and groups serves the dispatch — read
|
||||
// fresh: a route or target removed moments ago in another isolate must
|
||||
// not still be dispatched to from this isolate's cache.
|
||||
const snapshot = await loadConfigSnapshot(env, { fresh: true });
|
||||
if (tenantId) {
|
||||
const current = snapshot.groups.find((g) => g.id === tenantId);
|
||||
if (!current || current.instance !== tenant?.instance) {
|
||||
// Gone or replaced since its row was read: not this group's event now.
|
||||
await releaseClaims();
|
||||
if (snapshot.config.unreadableGroups?.includes(tenantId)) {
|
||||
return retryLater("Group configuration unreadable; retry later");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { status: 404, body: { error: "Group not found" } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
const scoped = tenantId
|
||||
? {
|
||||
...snapshot.config,
|
||||
routes: snapshot.config.routes.filter((r) => r.groupId === tenantId),
|
||||
}
|
||||
: snapshot.config;
|
||||
const ledgerKey = identity
|
||||
? deliveryStateKey(provider.id, tenantId, identity, tenant?.instance)
|
||||
: null;
|
||||
const run = (async (): Promise<InlineOutcome> => {
|
||||
const recorded = new Set<string>();
|
||||
// Dispatched under the delivery's identity (as a queued copy is), so the
|
||||
// platform idempotency keys stay the same when the sender retries.
|
||||
const delivered = identity ? { ...event, deliveryId: identity } : event;
|
||||
// Sending stops well before the claim held for this dispatch expires
|
||||
// (a target takes under a minute at worst): a copy arriving after that
|
||||
// could otherwise send the targets still in flight. What is left is a
|
||||
// transient failure, so the sender retries it (the ledger skips the rest).
|
||||
const sendUntil = Date.now() + INLINE_SEND_BUDGET_MS;
|
||||
const summary = await dispatchEvent(scoped, delivered, env, snapshot.groups, {
|
||||
tenantId,
|
||||
beforeTarget: async (): Promise<boolean> => Date.now() < sendUntil,
|
||||
skipTarget: ledgerKey ? targetDoneChecker(env, ledgerKey) : undefined,
|
||||
afterTarget: ledgerKey
|
||||
? async (targetKey): Promise<void> => {
|
||||
await markTargetsDone(env, ledgerKey, [targetKey]);
|
||||
recorded.add(targetKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
});
|
||||
const permanent = summary.failures.filter((f) => !isRetryableFailure(f));
|
||||
if (ledgerKey) {
|
||||
await markTargetsDone(
|
||||
env,
|
||||
ledgerKey,
|
||||
[...(summary.succeeded ?? []), ...permanent.flatMap((f) => f.key ?? [])].filter(
|
||||
(k) => !recorded.has(k),
|
||||
),
|
||||
{ permanentFailure: permanent.length > 0 },
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A transient failure is always retried: without a ledger the retry
|
||||
// sends the other targets again too — duplicates rather than a loss.
|
||||
return {
|
||||
retry: summary.failures.some(isRetryableFailure),
|
||||
// Targets that failed for good in an earlier attempt still count.
|
||||
failed:
|
||||
permanent.length > 0 ||
|
||||
(ledgerKey != null && (await hadPermanentFailure(env, ledgerKey))),
|
||||
};
|
||||
})();
|
||||
// The dispatch keeps running should the sender hang up meanwhile.
|
||||
waitUntil(run.catch(() => undefined));
|
||||
let outcome: InlineOutcome;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
outcome = await run;
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
log.error({ requestId, err }, "Dispatch failed");
|
||||
await releaseClaims();
|
||||
return retryLater("Dispatch failed; retry later");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (outcome.retry) {
|
||||
log.warn({ requestId }, "Inline dispatch failed transiently");
|
||||
await releaseClaims();
|
||||
return retryLater("Some targets failed temporarily; retry later");
|
||||
}
|
||||
await confirmClaims();
|
||||
// Accepted for good; a target that can never take the event is reported.
|
||||
return outcome.failed
|
||||
? { status: 200, body: { ok: true, requestId, failed: true } }
|
||||
: { status: 200, body: { ok: true, requestId } };
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
log.error({ requestId, err }, "Failed to accept webhook");
|
||||
await releaseClaims();
|
||||
return retryLater("Temporarily unable to accept webhook");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const config = await loadConfig(env);
|
||||
if (tenantId) {
|
||||
config.routes = config.routes.filter((r) => r.groupId === tenantId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (env.QUEUE) {
|
||||
const message: DeliveryMessage = {
|
||||
deliveryId: event.deliveryId ?? requestId,
|
||||
groupId: tenantId,
|
||||
provider: provider.id,
|
||||
event: event.event,
|
||||
payload: event.payload,
|
||||
installationId: event.installationId,
|
||||
receivedAt: Date.now(),
|
||||
requestId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const enqueue = enqueueWebhook(env, message).catch((err) =>
|
||||
log.error({ requestId, err }, "Failed to enqueue webhook"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
waitUntil(enqueue);
|
||||
return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, requestId } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const dispatch = dispatchEvent(config, event, env, groups).catch((err) =>
|
||||
log.error({ requestId, err }, "Dispatch failed"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
waitUntil(dispatch);
|
||||
|
||||
return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, requestId } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** h3 wrapper for `POST /webhook` / `POST /webhook/:groupId`. */
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user