fix(security): harden webhook delivery pipeline and group storage (#11)

* fix(log): preserve structured error details

Error objects lose their useful details when serialized as plain JSON.
Keep the message, stack and cause in structured log output.

* fix(runtime): bound shared in-flight waits

A canceled request can leave its shared promise pending forever.
Bound joins and coordinate a single replacement so later requests
make progress without multiplying upstream work.

* fix(bot): reject oversized callback bodies

Reject declared oversized bot callbacks before reading their bodies.
This keeps unauthenticated requests from wasting worker resources.

* test(d1): exercise real sqlite transactions

Exercise real foreign keys, transactions and conditional statements
instead of mocks that cannot reproduce lost updates or cascades.

* fix(storage): preserve claims across kv fallback

Only missing tables justify KV fallback; other failures must surface.
Remember fallback writes so migration to D1 cannot forget claims
and replay completed work. Share marker checks without extra writes.

* fix(filter): use isolated linear-time patterns

Backtracking patterns can exhaust worker CPU on untrusted payloads.
Use linear-time matching and separate bounded cache namespaces so
glob and regex entries cannot corrupt each other.

* fix(filter): read each event branch correctly

Deployment and check branches live in event-specific nested fields.
Read those fields and remove only the actual leading ref prefix.

* fix(filter): read only own payload properties

Inherited object properties are not webhook payload data.
Read own properties only so JSONPath cannot traverse prototypes.

* fix(filter): validate executable condition trees

Malformed trees and unsupported patterns must not silently turn an
exclude rule into a pass. Validate the shape and only the patterns
the evaluator actually executes.

* fix(i18n): bound and cache translation loads

Repeated misses and simultaneous override loads spend KV reads for
the same language. Cache confirmed misses and share bounded loads
without caching read failures as missing translations.

* i18n(bot): explain command and account failures

Explain account linking, command failures and skipped delivery
outcomes consistently in both supported languages.

* fix(github): bound and reuse app token fetches

Repeated token exchanges waste requests and JWT work for every event.
Reuse valid installation tokens, share refreshes and back off briefly
after failures while keeping every shared wait bounded.

* fix(github): restrict enrichment request urls

Webhook-provided URLs must never receive an installation token on
another host. Restrict enrichment to GitHub repository API paths,
reject redirects and bound optional requests.

* fix(formatter): preserve invalid code points

Out-of-range numeric entities can throw while formatting a delivery.
Keep invalid code points verbatim instead of aborting the message.

* fix(formatter): preserve bounded markdown text

Code spans, fences, indentation and autolinks are Markdown content,
not HTML tags to strip. Preserve them while bounding cleanup input
and reusing results across routes for the same event.

* fix(formatter): strip only leading ref prefixes

A short branch or tag may itself contain refs/heads or refs/tags.
Strip one leading full-ref prefix at the caller and keep short names
unchanged when generating labels and links.

* fix(gitea): link push authors to their forge

A Gitea author is not the same-named GitHub account.
Build author profile links from the originating forge.

* fix(formatter): render deployment state values

The deployment status object stringifies as [object Object].
Render its actual state in the status field.

* fix(formatter): read security severity levels

The scanner severity is not the security severity of an alert.
Prefer the security level so critical and high alerts get the right
label and color.

* fix(formatter): hide actions on other forges

Action buttons call the GitHub API as the linked user.
Hide them for other forges to avoid operating on a same-named
GitHub repository.

* fix(check): isolate updates by check suite

Same-named checks from different suites must not edit one message.
Include the suite or app identity and retain the former key for
controlled adoption of existing tracked messages.

* fix(logs): scope queries before limiting results

Filter authorized groups in SQL before LIMIT and aggregate only
visible rows. Preserve current group attribution for late writes,
surface read failures and combine related totals in one scan.

* perf(d1): index pruning and failed send queries

Pruning and failure views should not scan all historical rows.
Index the high-value access paths without adding a write-heavy
index for infrequent delivery-detail lookups.

* fix(discord): bound individual api requests

An unbounded API request can outlive an update-chain lock.
Bound each request so another holder cannot race a late edit.

* fix(discord): defer long rate-limit waits

Long rate-limit sleeps block delivery progress inside a worker.
Return a retryable 429 for the queue when the wait exceeds the bound.

* fix(discord): encode channel path segments

Stored channel and message ids are path segments, not URL paths.
Encode them so aliases cannot address another Discord resource.

* fix(discord): reuse nonces after lost responses

A successful create may lose its response. Reuse a stable nonce
with enforce_nonce so retries recover that message instead of
posting duplicates or accepting an unreadable success.

* fix(discord): constrain embeds and role mentions

Respect combined embed and component limits as well as field caps.
Restrict allowed mentions to validated route roles so payload text
cannot notify everyone.

* fix(discord): resume bounded command syncs

Application changes, command rollbacks and large guild lists can
leave commands stale indefinitely. Track the current hash per app
and resume bounded paginated work without needless KV writes.

* fix(github): verify installation management

An installation id is user-controlled, and repository access is not
installation management. Verify the owning account or an active
organization admin using the user token and read:org scope.

* fix(github): resolve immutable member ids

A login can be renamed and reclaimed before its first sign-in.
Resolve the current immutable user id when membership is granted
so a future holder of the login cannot inherit access.

* fix(auth): revoke stale sessions and tokens

Revoked or rotated credentials must stop working despite stale KV
replicas. Track the live token and revocations in D1 and preserve
immutable identity bindings rather than trusting a recycled login.

* fix(auth): bind sessions and tokens to identity

Automatic retries can repeat non-idempotent user actions.
Disable those retries and expose a write hook so bot handlers can
record completion immediately before the GitHub write.

* fix(discord): defer and deduplicate interactions

Acknowledge slow actions before Discord times out and deduplicate
interaction writes. Preserve comment text and reject edits whose
source changed after the modal opened.

* fix(telegram): always verify webhook secrets

Webhook verification must not silently disable itself when the
optional secret is absent. Derive a stable secret from the bot
token and reject callbacks when verification is unavailable.

* fix(telegram): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(telegram): honor nested rate-limit delays

Telegram places retry_after inside parameters, not at the top level.
Read that value and defer long waits to the delivery queue.

* fix(telegram): report unreadable send results

An unreadable successful response may already have sent the message.
Report an explicit uncertain result instead of retrying a create
without an idempotency key or pretending it succeeded.

* fix(telegram): keep editable messages as text

Guessing photo versus text from message content makes later edits
use the wrong API and a smaller caption budget. Always send text
and use the avatar as a link preview.

* fix(telegram): render hard breaks as newlines

Telegram HTML does not support br tags. Render Markdown hard breaks
as plain newlines so otherwise valid messages are accepted.

* fix(telegram): clamp visible html characters

Telegram counts visible characters, not HTML source bytes.
Truncate without splitting tags, entities or surrogate pairs.

* fix(telegram): honor the author emoji toggle

The author marker must obey the group emoji preference just like
formatter-added decoration.

* fix(telegram): keep completed commands claimed

Redelivery after a completed write must never post another comment.
Keep completion claims despite reply failures, scope updates per bot
and only issue account-login links in private chats.

* fix(feishu): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(feishu): classify retryable api failures

Business error codes can be transient even in HTTP 200 responses.
Classify token and rate-limit errors for retry and defer long waits.

* fix(feishu): retry sends with stable uuids

An unreadable response does not prove a send failed.
Reuse the same uuid for retries so recovering the result cannot
create a second Feishu message.

* fix(feishu): refresh and evict tokens safely

Separate app token caches, stop reusing refused tokens and share
refreshes. Cache failures briefly and keep valid tokens in memory
when a best-effort KV cache write fails.

* fix(feishu): use the card update endpoint

Delayed card updates use the card update endpoint; the config
endpoint cannot update an interaction response.

* fix(feishu): neutralize untrusted mentions

Forge text is untrusted and can contain at-all tags.
Neutralize mentions in card bodies and footers before rendering.

* fix(feishu): authenticate and dedupe callbacks

Authenticate signed or token-verified callbacks before dispatching
commands. Decode encrypted envelopes and handle card actions using
the correct fields without claiming irrelevant chat events.

* fix(target): normalize actual destinations

Different target spellings can name the same actual destination.
Normalize channel, thread and topic identities for ownership checks
and per-route duplicate suppression.

* fix(config): transact per-group configuration

Whole-table writes and cached snapshots can overwrite other groups
or resurrect removed configuration. Use per-group guarded writes,
one-time identity migration and explicit unreadable-row failures.

* fix(group): preserve identity through lifecycle

Group names are mutable and reusable, so they cannot own durable
state. Preserve immutable identities across lifecycle operations and
commit invite use with membership under transaction-time guards.

* fix(oauth): confirm account links and installs

A login link or installation id is not proof of account ownership.
Verify installation management, bind browser state and require an
explicit account-link confirmation before granting chat access.

* fix(queue): fence leases and record target outcomes

Retries must remember completed targets and distinguish active
lease holders. Fence state updates, preserve permanent outcomes and
reject missing parked payloads instead of dispatching empty data.

* fix(dispatch): isolate and resume tenant sends

Check tenant sources before filters and never dispatch orphan routes.
Record each target outcome, isolate update chains by forge and group
identity, and keep stale events from overwriting newer messages.

* fix(queue): bound batches and resume deliveries

A queue invocation has shared query and subrequest limits.
Use a small batch and shared send budget, renew fenced leases and
resume only unfinished work without exhausting unstarted messages.

* fix(admin): guard revisions and tenant targets

Read-time authorization alone cannot protect concurrent edits.
Guard revisions, current roles and destination ownership in the
write transaction, and use per-group endpoints for isolated changes.

* fix(webhook): confirm only accepted deliveries

Acknowledging before queue acceptance permanently loses deliveries.
Confirm only accepted work, release failed claims, scope replay
identities and strip tenant-supplied installation authority.

* fix(storage): prune abandoned parked payloads

Oversized payloads can remain after interrupted enqueue attempts.
Prune objects beyond their retry lifetime without deleting payloads
that a current delivery may still need.

* fix(console): expose api conflict statuses

Callers need the HTTP status to distinguish stale edits from other
failures and reload current data after a conflict.

* refactor(console): model group revisions

Carry server revisions explicitly so console writes can reject
changes based on an outdated group snapshot.

* fix(console): send loaded route revisions

Send the revision actually loaded with the route list and adopt the
server response after a save. Reload on conflict instead of silently
overwriting another editor.

* fix(console): guard fragment saves by revision

Fragments share a group version with other configuration writes.
Submit the loaded revision and reload on conflict to preserve
concurrent edits.

* fix(console): save groups with guarded writes

Whole-list saves can overwrite unrelated groups. Use per-group
revision-aware writes, retain rename results and confirm deletion
on the exact group, routes and version shown to the user.

* fix(console): reject edits of stale routes

A conflict reload can leave an older route editor open.
Compare its original value before saving so it cannot overwrite
the newly loaded route.

* fix(console): show overview loading failures

Failed overview requests must not look like an empty dashboard or
a successful refresh. Show the reason while retaining prior data.

* fix(console): explain rejected install bindings

Explain why an installation binding was refused instead of silently
returning to the console with no visible outcome.

* fix(console): allow selecting a group named all

The all sentinel collides with a valid group id.
Use a value that cannot be a group id so that group stays selectable.

* fix(console): discard stale log detail responses

An older detail request can finish after a newer selection or close.
Discard it so the dialog never shows the previously clicked record.

* fix(console): retain legacy group owners

Groups predating member roles store owners in adminIds.
Load those as owners so adding a member never drops all old owners.

* fix(console): lock member edits during saves

Edits made during a save are overwritten by its result.
Disable member controls and guard handlers until the write settles.

* fix(console): show invite loading failures

Failed invite loads must not look like no pending invites.
Show the error and discard responses from a previously shown group.

* fix(console): retain legacy discord log targets

A stored log target without platform means Discord.
Keep that meaning in the editor instead of clearing the target.

* fix(console): retain undisplayed forge sources

An editor that only displays some providers must preserve the others.
Keep stored custom sources when saving unrelated group settings.

* fix(console): lock the group editor while saving

Prevent edits while a group save is in flight and make super-only
installation settings readonly instead of silently ignoring edits.

* fix(console): lock route edits and show failures

Lock the route editor while saving and show fragment load failures
with a retry action rather than presenting a false empty list.

* fix(config): expose the legal contact override

Declare the public runtime key so the documented environment
override reaches legal pages in deployed Nuxt builds.

* build(deploy): migrate d1 before deployment

Apply pending D1 migrations before deploying code that requires
them. Stop deployment when migration fails instead of running
against an incomplete schema.

* docs(worker): align guides with runtime behavior

Synchronize both language guides, API references and examples with
the implemented authorization, storage and delivery behavior.
Document migration requirements and accepted operational limits.

* fix(storage): repair orphaned KV routes

Repair orphaned KV routes before serving KV-only configuration.

* fix(security): fully escape forge HTML

---------

Co-authored-by: RhenCloud <i@rhen.cloud>
This commit is contained in:
翅膀喵andRhenCloud authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-24 16:19:06 +08:00
1 parent dbf162bf74
commit 978c53eeb3
163 files changed
+18459 -3607

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+11 -11
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Creates a comment on an issue or pull request.
| `issueNumber` | number | Yes | Issue or PR number |
| `body` | string | Yes | Comment body (Markdown supported) |
**Response:** `200` with GitHub API response.
**Response:** `200 { "ok": true }`.
### Merge Pull Request
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Merges a pull request.
| `pullNumber` | number | Yes | Pull request number |
| `method` | string | No | `merge`, `squash`, or `rebase` (default: `squash`) |
**Response:** `200` with GitHub merge response.
**Response:** `200 { "ok": true }`.
### Close Pull Request
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Closes a pull request without merging.
| `repo` | string | Yes | Repository name |
| `pullNumber` | number | Yes | Pull request number |
**Response:** `200` with GitHub update response.
**Response:** `200 { "ok": true }`.
### Add Reaction
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Closes a pull request without merging.
POST /api/react
```
Adds an emoji reaction to an issue or comment.
Adds an emoji reaction to an issue or pull request (not to a comment).
**Request Body:**
@@ -115,18 +115,18 @@ Adds an emoji reaction to an issue or comment.
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
| ------------- | ------ | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `owner` | string | Yes | Repository owner |
| `repo` | string | Yes | Repository name |
| `issueNumber` | number | Yes | Issue, PR, or comment number |
| `reaction` | string | Yes | Reaction type (see below) |
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
| ------------- | ------ | -------- | ------------------------- |
| `owner` | string | Yes | Repository owner |
| `repo` | string | Yes | Repository name |
| `issueNumber` | number | Yes | Issue or PR number |
| `reaction` | string | Yes | Reaction type (see below) |
**Reaction Types:**
`+1`, `-1`, `laugh`, `confused`, `heart`, `hooray`, `rocket`, `eyes`
**Response:** `200` with GitHub reaction response.
**Response:** `200 { "ok": true }`.
## Error Responses
+42 -32
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@@ -6,41 +6,51 @@ The console itself is served at `/admin`; its tabs are deep-linkable via the URL
## Endpoints
| Endpoint | Description |
| ----------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `GET /admin` | Config console UI |
| `GET /admin/login` | Start admin sign-in (GitHub OAuth) |
| `GET /admin/logout` | Sign out and destroy the session |
| `GET /admin/invite?token=…` | Accept a group invite (browser page) |
| `GET /admin/api/me` | Current session, scope, groups, and roles |
| `GET /admin/api/routes` | List routes (scoped to access) |
| `PUT /admin/api/routes` | Replace routes (owner/admin per group) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups` | List groups + the signed-in user's role in each |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups` | Replace groups (super: all; owner: own only) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/routes` | List a group's routes |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/routes` | Replace a group's routes (owner/admin) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/fragments` | List a group's named filter fragments |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/fragments` | Replace a group's named filter fragments (owner/admin) |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/rename` | Rename a group (owner); routes, webhook secret and invites follow (routes are moved before the group record is updated) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/invites` | List pending invites (owner) |
| `POST /admin/api/groups/:id/invites` | Create an invite link (owner) |
| `DELETE /admin/api/invites/:token` | Revoke an invite (owner) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook` | Group webhook endpoint info (owner) |
| `POST /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook/regenerate` | Generate/regenerate the group webhook secret (owner) |
| `DELETE /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook` | Disable the group webhook ingress (owner) |
| `GET /admin/api/logs` | Send logs (scoped to accessible routes) |
| `GET /admin/api/logs/:id` | Single send-log entry (scoped) |
| `GET /admin/api/audit` | Audit log (scoped to accessible groups) |
| `GET /admin/api/metrics` | Delivery stats (totals, failure rate, per platform/event/status, recent failures); optional `?groupId=` scope; recent failures scoped to accessible groups for non-super |
| `GET /admin/api/delivery/:deliveryId` | All send-log attempts for one delivery (group-scoped) |
| `POST /admin/api/test-match` | Stateless filter dry-run — evaluate a filter node against a pasted JSON payload (no event is stored) |
| Endpoint | Description |
| ----------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `GET /admin` | Config console UI |
| `GET /admin/login` | Start admin sign-in (GitHub OAuth) |
| `GET /admin/logout` | Sign out and destroy the session |
| `GET /admin/invite?token=…` | Accept a group invite (browser page) |
| `GET /admin/api/me` | Current session, scope, groups, and roles |
| `GET /admin/api/routes` | List routes (scoped to access) |
| `PUT /admin/api/routes` | Replace routes (owner/admin per group) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups` | List groups (each with its `revision`) + the signed-in user's role in each, plus the list `revision` |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups` | Bulk write (legacy): super admins replace all groups, owners change/delete their own; only groups that differ are written |
| `POST /admin/api/groups` | Create one group (super admins) — body `{ group }`; `409` when the id exists or was used recently |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id` | Update one group (owner) — body `{ group }`; `409` when its `revision` is stale |
| `DELETE /admin/api/groups/:id` | Delete one group with its routes and fragments (owner) — query `revision`, `routesRevision` and `version` from the confirmation; `409` when anything changed since |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/routes` | List a group's routes, with the list's `revision`, the group `version` and `unreadable` |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/routes` | Replace a group's routes (owner/admin) — `409` when the sent `revision` is stale |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/fragments` | List a group's named filter fragments, with the list's `revision` |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/fragments` | Replace a group's named filter fragments (owner/admin) — body `{ fragments, revision? }`; `409` when the `revision` is stale |
| `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/rename` | Rename a group (owner) — body `{ newId, revision? }`; routes, fragments and history move in one transaction, the secret and invites stay with the group; the old id stays retired for a few days |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/invites` | List pending invites (owner) |
| `POST /admin/api/groups/:id/invites` | Create an invite link (owner) — body `{ role, note? }` (`role` is `admin` or `viewer`) |
| `DELETE /admin/api/invites/:token` | Revoke an invite (owner) |
| `GET /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook` | Group webhook endpoint info (owner) |
| `POST /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook/regenerate` | Generate/regenerate the group webhook secret (owner) |
| `DELETE /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook` | Disable the group webhook ingress (owner) |
| `GET /admin/api/logs` | Send logs of the accessible groups (filtered in SQL before the limit) |
| `GET /admin/api/logs/:id` | Single send-log entry (scoped) |
| `GET /admin/api/audit` | Audit log of the accessible groups (filtered in SQL before the limit) |
| `GET /admin/api/metrics` | Delivery stats (totals, failure rate, per platform/event/status, recent failures); optional `?groupId=` scope; every aggregate is limited to the accessible groups |
| `GET /admin/api/delivery/:deliveryId` | The attempts of one delivery that belong to the accessible groups; optional `?groupId=` (two groups' senders may use the same delivery id) |
| `POST /admin/api/test-match` | Stateless filter dry-run — evaluate a filter node against a pasted JSON payload (no event is stored) |
## Validation
- `PUT /admin/api/routes` — Body `{ "routes": Route[] }`; validates each route (id pattern, unique id within its group, name, enabled, `groupId`, filters — empty only allowed for `fallback` routes — optional `discordRoleIds` (list of role id strings), and platform-aware targets: `target.channelId` for Discord, `target.chatId` for Telegram) and persists to D1 `d1_routes`. Returns `200 { ok, count }` or `400 { error }` / `401 { error }` / `403 { error }`. Unchanged routes skip the full validation. Route filters support the `field` type (a JSONPath `path` into `payload`, arrays expand so any element matches) and 12 `op` operators (`eq` default / `ne` / `contains` / `startsWith` / `endsWith` / `regex` / `gt` / `gte` / `lt` / `lte` / `in` / `exists`); a nested `ast` (`all` / `any` / `not`) takes precedence over `filters` when present.
- `PUT /admin/api/groups` — Validates group ids, member roles (at least one `owner`), `providers` (`github` / `gitea`), and `installationId`.
- `PUT /admin/api/routes` — Body `{ "routes": Route[] }`; validates each route (id pattern, unique id within its group, name, enabled, `groupId`, filters — an array, empty only for `fallback` routes or when a valid `ast` is present; patterns the matcher cannot compile — longer than 200 characters, or RE2-unsupported syntax such as backreferences or lookaround — are rejected; flat `filters` hold leaf conditions only (`all`/`any`/`not` belong in `ast`); `keyword` only supports the default `eq`; `exists` may omit `match` — optional `discordRoleIds` (at most 50 numeric Discord role ids), and platform-aware targets: `target.channelId` for Discord, `target.chatId` for Telegram/Feishu, with the id rules and duplicate-destination check in [Routes & Targets](../guide/routes)) and persists to D1 `d1_routes`, rewriting only the groups whose routes changed. A non-super admin pointing a target at a channel another group uses gets `403`. Returns `200 { ok, count }` or `400 { error }` / `401 { error }` / `403 { error }`. Unchanged routes skip the full validation. Route filters support the `field` type (a JSONPath `path` into `payload`, arrays expand so any element matches) and 12 `op` operators (`eq` default / `ne` / `contains` / `startsWith` / `endsWith` / `regex` / `gt` / `gte` / `lt` / `lte` / `in` / `exists`); a nested `ast` (`all` / `any` / `not`) takes precedence over `filters` when present.
- `PUT /admin/api/groups` / `POST /admin/api/groups` / `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id` — Validate group ids, `members` (or legacy `adminIds`; a non-empty `members` list needs at least one `owner`), `forgeSources` (at most 20, `name` up to 50 characters, unique type + host), `providers` (`github` / `gitea` / `custom`), and `installationId`; unknown fields are dropped. The source-isolation fields `owners`, `installationId` and `isolated` are super-admin only: an owner's write keeps their stored values. New members' logins are resolved to GitHub user ids with the writer's token; the server-only fields (`instance`, the webhook secret, member user ids) can never be set by the client.
- Every write re-checks the writer's role inside its transaction: a request authorized before the role was revoked is refused (`409` for route/fragment writes, `403` for group writes).
- Optimistic concurrency — every list or group the API returns carries a `revision`. Send it back with the write (`group.revision`, or `revision` next to `routes` / `fragments` / `newId`, or the list `revision` of the bulk groups write) and the server refuses the write with `409` if the stored data changed since it was loaded, instead of overwriting the newer change. Writes without a `revision` are applied as before. In the bulk groups write, a group echoed back unedited is never written.
- `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/routes` — Optional `discardUnreadable: true` replaces stored routes that cannot be read (otherwise the save is refused while the group has any).
- `PUT /admin/api/routes` — Optionally send `revisions` (the per-group map returned by `GET /admin/api/routes`): groups whose list comes back unedited are not written, groups the client never loaded are not touched, and edited groups must still be at their loaded revision (`409` otherwise). Each group is written in its own guarded transaction.
- `PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/rename` — Optional `revision`; returns `{ ok, id, group, revision }` (the renamed group and its new revision). Ids starting with `inst-` or `u-` are reserved for super admins.
- `DELETE /admin/api/groups/:id` — Requires `revision`, `routesRevision` and `version` as seen at confirmation (`400` when missing, `409` when the group, its routes or fragments changed, or when it has routes that cannot be read). Also revokes the group's invites and webhook secret, detaches its send logs and audit entries (they stay visible to super admins only), and retires the id for a few days so queued deliveries cannot reach a new group that reuses it.
- `POST /admin/api/groups/:id/webhook/regenerate` — Returns `{ ok, url, secret, hasSecret }`; the secret is shown only in this response.
- `POST /admin/api/test-match` — Body `{ "node": FilterNode | "filters": Filter[], "event"?: string, "payload": object }`; evaluates in memory and returns `{ matched, explanation }`. Nothing is persisted.
- `GET/PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/fragments` — Named filter fragments (`{ id, groupId, name, node }`) stored in D1 `d1_fragments`; the editor inlines a fragment's `node` into a route's `ast` on insert (the matcher never resolves fragment references). `PUT` replaces the group's fragments and returns `200 { ok, count }`.
- Limits: at most 200 routes and 100 groups per instance.
- `GET/PUT /admin/api/groups/:id/fragments` — Named filter fragments (`{ id, groupId, name, node }`) stored in D1 `d1_fragments`; the editor inlines a fragment's `node` into a route's `ast` on insert (the matcher never resolves fragment references). `PUT` replaces the group's fragments (at most 200) and returns `200 { ok, count }`.
- Limits: one save accepts at most 200 routes, 200 fragments per group, and 100 groups in the bulk groups write.
Schemas: [Routes & Targets](../guide/routes), [Groups & Access Control](../guide/groups).
+14 -5
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@@ -42,12 +42,21 @@ GitHub redirects here after authorization. Exchanges the code for an access toke
| `code` | Authorization code |
| `state` | State parameter for CSRF protection |
A sign-in started in the browser (`GET /auth/github`) must come back with the `wh_oauth_state` cookie that start set; otherwise the callback answers `400 Invalid or expired state`.
**Response:**
- **Browser flow** (`Accept: text/html`): sets an admin session cookie, then redirects to the `redirect` target. Users without admin access are redirected to `/admin?error=forbidden`.
- **JSON flow**: returns `{ "userId": "...", "login": "...", "redirectTo": "..." }`.
- **Discord link flow** (started with a pending `discordUserId`): links the Discord user to this GitHub account, returning `{ "ok": true, "discordUserId": "...", "login": "..." }` — or a success page in the browser.
- **Telegram link flow** (started with a pending `telegramUserId`): links the Telegram user to this GitHub account, returns `{ "ok": true, "telegramUserId": "...", "login": "..." }`, and sends a confirmation message to the pending `telegramChatId`.
- **Bot account link** (started by `/gh login` on Discord, Telegram or Feishu): nothing is linked yet. The callback answers with an HTML confirmation page that names both the GitHub account and the chat account; the link is written only when the GitHub user confirms it there.
### Confirm Bot Account Link
```
POST /auth/github/link
```
Submitted by the confirmation page (form field `nonce`, valid for 10 minutes and usable once). Links the chat account to the GitHub account and answers with an HTML result page; an unknown, expired or already used `nonce` gets `400` ("link expired").
### Revoke Token
@@ -55,7 +64,7 @@ GitHub redirects here after authorization. Exchanges the code for an access toke
DELETE /auth/token/:userId
```
Removes the stored OAuth token for a user.
Removes the stored OAuth token for a user (your own, or any user's for a super admin). The revocation is recorded in D1, so the token stops working everywhere at once, even where KV has not caught up yet.
**Response:**
@@ -74,11 +83,11 @@ Tokens are stored in KV with key pattern `token:{userId}`:
"userId": "12345",
"accessToken": "gho_...",
"expiresAt": 1735689600000,
"refreshToken": "..."
"live": true
}
```
`expiresAt` is a Unix timestamp in milliseconds. KV entries expire at 90% of the token's lifetime (minimum 60 seconds). A reverse index `token-reverse:{sha256 of token}` maps the access token back to its user id so Bearer-authenticated endpoints can resolve the caller. Discord users linked to a GitHub account are stored in the D1 `discord_links` table; Telegram users in the D1 `telegram_links` table.
`expiresAt` is a Unix timestamp in milliseconds. A stored token is used for 10 hours; the KV entry expires after 9 hours (90%). Tokens are not refreshed — after that, sign in (or run `/gh login`) again. `live` marks a token whose "current token" record is kept in D1: signing in again or signing out invalidates the previous token everywhere at once. A reverse index `token-reverse:{sha256 of token}` maps the access token back to its user id so Bearer-authenticated endpoints can resolve the caller. Discord users linked to a GitHub account are stored in the D1 `discord_links` table; Telegram users in the D1 `telegram_links` table.
## Using Tokens
+16 -10
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@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@ https://your-worker.workers.dev
| `POST` | `/webhook/:groupId` | Per-group secret | Per-group webhook ingress (only that group's routes fire) |
| `POST` | `/discord/interactions` | Ed25519 signature | Discord interactions (slash commands, buttons, modals) |
| `POST` | `/telegram/webhook` | Secret token | Telegram updates (bot `/gh` commands) |
| `POST` | `/feishu/webhook` | Feishu signature | Feishu events (bot `/gh` commands, card buttons) |
| `GET` | `/api/richheader` | None | Open Graph page for the Telegram avatar link-preview card |
| `GET` | `/auth/github` | None | Start GitHub OAuth flow |
| `GET` | `/auth/github/callback` | None | OAuth callback |
| `POST` | `/auth/github/link` | Link nonce | Confirm a bot account link (from the confirmation page) |
| `GET` | `/auth/github/install` | Admin session | Post-install choice page: bind the installation to a group |
| `POST` | `/auth/github/install/bind` | Admin session | Provision the chosen installation binding |
| `DELETE` | `/auth/token/:userId` | Admin session | Revoke user token |
@@ -74,27 +76,31 @@ Accepts GitHub webhook payloads. Requires valid `X-Hub-Signature-256` header.
```json
{
"ok": true
"ok": true,
"requestId": "…"
}
```
When `X-GitHub-Delivery` is present and the same delivery was already processed within the last 5 minutes, the worker responds `200 { "ok": true, "duplicate": true }` without re-dispatching.
`requestId` is the correlation id written to the worker's logs. With inline dispatch (no queue), an event whose targets failed permanently is still answered `200`, with `"failed": true` added.
When `X-GitHub-Delivery` is present and the same delivery was already accepted, the worker responds `200 { "ok": true, "duplicate": true }` without re-dispatching; while the first copy is still being processed, a redelivery gets `503` so the sender retries later.
**Error Responses:**
| Status | Body | Cause |
| ------ | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| `401` | `{"error": "Invalid signature"}` | Signature verification failed |
| `400` | `{"error": "Invalid event"}` | Missing event header or malformed body |
| `413` | `{"error": "Request too large"}` | Body exceeds 1MB limit |
| Status | Body | Cause |
| ------ | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `401` | `{"error": "Invalid signature"}` | Signature verification failed |
| `400` | `{"error": "Invalid event"}` | Missing event header or malformed body |
| `413` | `{"error": "Request too large"}` | Body exceeds 1MB limit |
| `503` | `{"error": …}` | Not accepted yet — the queue rejected the event, a target failed transiently (inline dispatch), the same delivery is still being processed, or storage failed; the sender should redeliver |
### Per-Group Webhook (`POST /webhook/:groupId`)
Verifies the payload against the **group's** secret (KV `tenant:{groupId}`, generated from the console — Webhook endpoint panel) instead of the global secrets, and dispatches only into that group's routes. Works for GitHub (`X-Hub-Signature-256`), Gitea (`X-Gitea-Signature`) and custom (`X-WebHooker-Signature`) senders. Returns `404` when the group does not exist or has no secret configured.
Verifies the payload against the **group's** secret (stored with the group in D1, generated from the console — Webhook endpoint panel) instead of the global secrets, and dispatches only into that group's routes. Works for GitHub (`X-Hub-Signature-256`), Gitea (`X-Gitea-Signature`) and custom (`X-WebHooker-Signature`) senders. Returns `404` when the group does not exist or has no secret configured, and `503` when the group's stored configuration cannot be read.
### Custom Webhooks
Any JSON payload signed with `X-WebHooker-Signature: sha256=<hex>` (HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body, group or global secret) becomes a `custom` event. Route it with a route whose filter is `event: custom`. Optional `X-WebHooker-Timestamp` + `X-WebHooker-Nonce` headers enable replay protection (signature over `{timestamp}.{nonce}.{body}`, ±5 min window, nonce dedup). Payload schema: see [Configuration → Custom webhooks](../guide/ingress.md#custom-webhooks).
Any JSON object signed with `X-WebHooker-Signature: sha256=<hex>` (HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body, group or global secret) becomes a `custom` event. Route it with a route whose filter is `event: custom`. Optional `X-WebHooker-Timestamp` + `X-WebHooker-Nonce` headers enable replay protection (signature over `{timestamp}.{nonce}.{body}`, ±5 min window, nonce dedup). Payload schema: see [Configuration → Custom webhooks](../guide/ingress.md#custom-webhooks).
### GitHub App Installation Events
@@ -109,7 +115,7 @@ The primary flow is the App's **Setup URL** — set it to `{BASE_URL}/auth/githu
## Error Format
All error responses follow the format:
Error responses of the webhook, admin, OAuth and action endpoints follow the format below; the bot callbacks (`/discord/interactions`, `/telegram/webhook`, `/feishu/webhook`) answer errors with a plain-text body:
```json
{