Files
翅膀喵andRhenCloud 978c53eeb3 fix(security): harden webhook delivery pipeline and group storage (#11)
* fix(log): preserve structured error details

Error objects lose their useful details when serialized as plain JSON.
Keep the message, stack and cause in structured log output.

* fix(runtime): bound shared in-flight waits

A canceled request can leave its shared promise pending forever.
Bound joins and coordinate a single replacement so later requests
make progress without multiplying upstream work.

* fix(bot): reject oversized callback bodies

Reject declared oversized bot callbacks before reading their bodies.
This keeps unauthenticated requests from wasting worker resources.

* test(d1): exercise real sqlite transactions

Exercise real foreign keys, transactions and conditional statements
instead of mocks that cannot reproduce lost updates or cascades.

* fix(storage): preserve claims across kv fallback

Only missing tables justify KV fallback; other failures must surface.
Remember fallback writes so migration to D1 cannot forget claims
and replay completed work. Share marker checks without extra writes.

* fix(filter): use isolated linear-time patterns

Backtracking patterns can exhaust worker CPU on untrusted payloads.
Use linear-time matching and separate bounded cache namespaces so
glob and regex entries cannot corrupt each other.

* fix(filter): read each event branch correctly

Deployment and check branches live in event-specific nested fields.
Read those fields and remove only the actual leading ref prefix.

* fix(filter): read only own payload properties

Inherited object properties are not webhook payload data.
Read own properties only so JSONPath cannot traverse prototypes.

* fix(filter): validate executable condition trees

Malformed trees and unsupported patterns must not silently turn an
exclude rule into a pass. Validate the shape and only the patterns
the evaluator actually executes.

* fix(i18n): bound and cache translation loads

Repeated misses and simultaneous override loads spend KV reads for
the same language. Cache confirmed misses and share bounded loads
without caching read failures as missing translations.

* i18n(bot): explain command and account failures

Explain account linking, command failures and skipped delivery
outcomes consistently in both supported languages.

* fix(github): bound and reuse app token fetches

Repeated token exchanges waste requests and JWT work for every event.
Reuse valid installation tokens, share refreshes and back off briefly
after failures while keeping every shared wait bounded.

* fix(github): restrict enrichment request urls

Webhook-provided URLs must never receive an installation token on
another host. Restrict enrichment to GitHub repository API paths,
reject redirects and bound optional requests.

* fix(formatter): preserve invalid code points

Out-of-range numeric entities can throw while formatting a delivery.
Keep invalid code points verbatim instead of aborting the message.

* fix(formatter): preserve bounded markdown text

Code spans, fences, indentation and autolinks are Markdown content,
not HTML tags to strip. Preserve them while bounding cleanup input
and reusing results across routes for the same event.

* fix(formatter): strip only leading ref prefixes

A short branch or tag may itself contain refs/heads or refs/tags.
Strip one leading full-ref prefix at the caller and keep short names
unchanged when generating labels and links.

* fix(gitea): link push authors to their forge

A Gitea author is not the same-named GitHub account.
Build author profile links from the originating forge.

* fix(formatter): render deployment state values

The deployment status object stringifies as [object Object].
Render its actual state in the status field.

* fix(formatter): read security severity levels

The scanner severity is not the security severity of an alert.
Prefer the security level so critical and high alerts get the right
label and color.

* fix(formatter): hide actions on other forges

Action buttons call the GitHub API as the linked user.
Hide them for other forges to avoid operating on a same-named
GitHub repository.

* fix(check): isolate updates by check suite

Same-named checks from different suites must not edit one message.
Include the suite or app identity and retain the former key for
controlled adoption of existing tracked messages.

* fix(logs): scope queries before limiting results

Filter authorized groups in SQL before LIMIT and aggregate only
visible rows. Preserve current group attribution for late writes,
surface read failures and combine related totals in one scan.

* perf(d1): index pruning and failed send queries

Pruning and failure views should not scan all historical rows.
Index the high-value access paths without adding a write-heavy
index for infrequent delivery-detail lookups.

* fix(discord): bound individual api requests

An unbounded API request can outlive an update-chain lock.
Bound each request so another holder cannot race a late edit.

* fix(discord): defer long rate-limit waits

Long rate-limit sleeps block delivery progress inside a worker.
Return a retryable 429 for the queue when the wait exceeds the bound.

* fix(discord): encode channel path segments

Stored channel and message ids are path segments, not URL paths.
Encode them so aliases cannot address another Discord resource.

* fix(discord): reuse nonces after lost responses

A successful create may lose its response. Reuse a stable nonce
with enforce_nonce so retries recover that message instead of
posting duplicates or accepting an unreadable success.

* fix(discord): constrain embeds and role mentions

Respect combined embed and component limits as well as field caps.
Restrict allowed mentions to validated route roles so payload text
cannot notify everyone.

* fix(discord): resume bounded command syncs

Application changes, command rollbacks and large guild lists can
leave commands stale indefinitely. Track the current hash per app
and resume bounded paginated work without needless KV writes.

* fix(github): verify installation management

An installation id is user-controlled, and repository access is not
installation management. Verify the owning account or an active
organization admin using the user token and read:org scope.

* fix(github): resolve immutable member ids

A login can be renamed and reclaimed before its first sign-in.
Resolve the current immutable user id when membership is granted
so a future holder of the login cannot inherit access.

* fix(auth): revoke stale sessions and tokens

Revoked or rotated credentials must stop working despite stale KV
replicas. Track the live token and revocations in D1 and preserve
immutable identity bindings rather than trusting a recycled login.

* fix(auth): bind sessions and tokens to identity

Automatic retries can repeat non-idempotent user actions.
Disable those retries and expose a write hook so bot handlers can
record completion immediately before the GitHub write.

* fix(discord): defer and deduplicate interactions

Acknowledge slow actions before Discord times out and deduplicate
interaction writes. Preserve comment text and reject edits whose
source changed after the modal opened.

* fix(telegram): always verify webhook secrets

Webhook verification must not silently disable itself when the
optional secret is absent. Derive a stable secret from the bot
token and reject callbacks when verification is unavailable.

* fix(telegram): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(telegram): honor nested rate-limit delays

Telegram places retry_after inside parameters, not at the top level.
Read that value and defer long waits to the delivery queue.

* fix(telegram): report unreadable send results

An unreadable successful response may already have sent the message.
Report an explicit uncertain result instead of retrying a create
without an idempotency key or pretending it succeeded.

* fix(telegram): keep editable messages as text

Guessing photo versus text from message content makes later edits
use the wrong API and a smaller caption budget. Always send text
and use the avatar as a link preview.

* fix(telegram): render hard breaks as newlines

Telegram HTML does not support br tags. Render Markdown hard breaks
as plain newlines so otherwise valid messages are accepted.

* fix(telegram): clamp visible html characters

Telegram counts visible characters, not HTML source bytes.
Truncate without splitting tags, entities or surrogate pairs.

* fix(telegram): honor the author emoji toggle

The author marker must obey the group emoji preference just like
formatter-added decoration.

* fix(telegram): keep completed commands claimed

Redelivery after a completed write must never post another comment.
Keep completion claims despite reply failures, scope updates per bot
and only issue account-login links in private chats.

* fix(feishu): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(feishu): classify retryable api failures

Business error codes can be transient even in HTTP 200 responses.
Classify token and rate-limit errors for retry and defer long waits.

* fix(feishu): retry sends with stable uuids

An unreadable response does not prove a send failed.
Reuse the same uuid for retries so recovering the result cannot
create a second Feishu message.

* fix(feishu): refresh and evict tokens safely

Separate app token caches, stop reusing refused tokens and share
refreshes. Cache failures briefly and keep valid tokens in memory
when a best-effort KV cache write fails.

* fix(feishu): use the card update endpoint

Delayed card updates use the card update endpoint; the config
endpoint cannot update an interaction response.

* fix(feishu): neutralize untrusted mentions

Forge text is untrusted and can contain at-all tags.
Neutralize mentions in card bodies and footers before rendering.

* fix(feishu): authenticate and dedupe callbacks

Authenticate signed or token-verified callbacks before dispatching
commands. Decode encrypted envelopes and handle card actions using
the correct fields without claiming irrelevant chat events.

* fix(target): normalize actual destinations

Different target spellings can name the same actual destination.
Normalize channel, thread and topic identities for ownership checks
and per-route duplicate suppression.

* fix(config): transact per-group configuration

Whole-table writes and cached snapshots can overwrite other groups
or resurrect removed configuration. Use per-group guarded writes,
one-time identity migration and explicit unreadable-row failures.

* fix(group): preserve identity through lifecycle

Group names are mutable and reusable, so they cannot own durable
state. Preserve immutable identities across lifecycle operations and
commit invite use with membership under transaction-time guards.

* fix(oauth): confirm account links and installs

A login link or installation id is not proof of account ownership.
Verify installation management, bind browser state and require an
explicit account-link confirmation before granting chat access.

* fix(queue): fence leases and record target outcomes

Retries must remember completed targets and distinguish active
lease holders. Fence state updates, preserve permanent outcomes and
reject missing parked payloads instead of dispatching empty data.

* fix(dispatch): isolate and resume tenant sends

Check tenant sources before filters and never dispatch orphan routes.
Record each target outcome, isolate update chains by forge and group
identity, and keep stale events from overwriting newer messages.

* fix(queue): bound batches and resume deliveries

A queue invocation has shared query and subrequest limits.
Use a small batch and shared send budget, renew fenced leases and
resume only unfinished work without exhausting unstarted messages.

* fix(admin): guard revisions and tenant targets

Read-time authorization alone cannot protect concurrent edits.
Guard revisions, current roles and destination ownership in the
write transaction, and use per-group endpoints for isolated changes.

* fix(webhook): confirm only accepted deliveries

Acknowledging before queue acceptance permanently loses deliveries.
Confirm only accepted work, release failed claims, scope replay
identities and strip tenant-supplied installation authority.

* fix(storage): prune abandoned parked payloads

Oversized payloads can remain after interrupted enqueue attempts.
Prune objects beyond their retry lifetime without deleting payloads
that a current delivery may still need.

* fix(console): expose api conflict statuses

Callers need the HTTP status to distinguish stale edits from other
failures and reload current data after a conflict.

* refactor(console): model group revisions

Carry server revisions explicitly so console writes can reject
changes based on an outdated group snapshot.

* fix(console): send loaded route revisions

Send the revision actually loaded with the route list and adopt the
server response after a save. Reload on conflict instead of silently
overwriting another editor.

* fix(console): guard fragment saves by revision

Fragments share a group version with other configuration writes.
Submit the loaded revision and reload on conflict to preserve
concurrent edits.

* fix(console): save groups with guarded writes

Whole-list saves can overwrite unrelated groups. Use per-group
revision-aware writes, retain rename results and confirm deletion
on the exact group, routes and version shown to the user.

* fix(console): reject edits of stale routes

A conflict reload can leave an older route editor open.
Compare its original value before saving so it cannot overwrite
the newly loaded route.

* fix(console): show overview loading failures

Failed overview requests must not look like an empty dashboard or
a successful refresh. Show the reason while retaining prior data.

* fix(console): explain rejected install bindings

Explain why an installation binding was refused instead of silently
returning to the console with no visible outcome.

* fix(console): allow selecting a group named all

The all sentinel collides with a valid group id.
Use a value that cannot be a group id so that group stays selectable.

* fix(console): discard stale log detail responses

An older detail request can finish after a newer selection or close.
Discard it so the dialog never shows the previously clicked record.

* fix(console): retain legacy group owners

Groups predating member roles store owners in adminIds.
Load those as owners so adding a member never drops all old owners.

* fix(console): lock member edits during saves

Edits made during a save are overwritten by its result.
Disable member controls and guard handlers until the write settles.

* fix(console): show invite loading failures

Failed invite loads must not look like no pending invites.
Show the error and discard responses from a previously shown group.

* fix(console): retain legacy discord log targets

A stored log target without platform means Discord.
Keep that meaning in the editor instead of clearing the target.

* fix(console): retain undisplayed forge sources

An editor that only displays some providers must preserve the others.
Keep stored custom sources when saving unrelated group settings.

* fix(console): lock the group editor while saving

Prevent edits while a group save is in flight and make super-only
installation settings readonly instead of silently ignoring edits.

* fix(console): lock route edits and show failures

Lock the route editor while saving and show fragment load failures
with a retry action rather than presenting a false empty list.

* fix(config): expose the legal contact override

Declare the public runtime key so the documented environment
override reaches legal pages in deployed Nuxt builds.

* build(deploy): migrate d1 before deployment

Apply pending D1 migrations before deploying code that requires
them. Stop deployment when migration fails instead of running
against an incomplete schema.

* docs(worker): align guides with runtime behavior

Synchronize both language guides, API references and examples with
the implemented authorization, storage and delivery behavior.
Document migration requirements and accepted operational limits.

* fix(storage): repair orphaned KV routes

Repair orphaned KV routes before serving KV-only configuration.

* fix(security): fully escape forge HTML

---------

Co-authored-by: RhenCloud <i@rhen.cloud>
2026-10-24 16:19:06 +08:00

10 KiB

Webhook Ingress & Tenancy

Webhook Providers

WebHooker ingests webhooks from multiple forges through the same POST /webhook endpoint; the provider is auto-detected from the request headers, so point every forge's webhook at {BASE_URL}/webhook.

Provider Event header Signature header Signature format Secret
GitHub X-GitHub-Event X-Hub-Signature-256 sha256=<hex> HMAC-SHA256 GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET
Gitea X-Gitea-Event X-Gitea-Signature plain hex HMAC-SHA256 GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET

Delivery-id dedup uses X-GitHub-Delivery (GitHub) or X-Gitea-Delivery (Gitea) when present.

With the delivery queue enabled, a webhook is acknowledged (200) only after it was durably enqueued. If the queue rejects it, the endpoint answers 503 and releases the dedup claim, so the sender's redelivery is accepted instead of being dropped as a duplicate. A redelivery of a webhook that was already accepted answers 200 { "duplicate": true }; one that arrives while the first copy is still being processed answers 503, so the sender tries again later.

Without the queue binding, the webhook is dispatched inline and answered only once dispatch finished: 200 when every target was handled, 503 when a target failed transiently (the sender's redelivery then skips the targets that already succeeded). Inline dispatch stops sending after 8 minutes and answers 503 for the rest, so one request never outlives its dedup claim.

Gitea payloads are normalized to the same internal shape as GitHub events, so routes, filters, and the 28 formatters work unchanged. Unknown or unmapped Gitea events fall back to the generic formatter. Repository/commit/user links are derived from the payload's repository.html_url, so they point at your Gitea instance.

Global Endpoint (POST /webhook)

The global endpoint verifies payloads against the operator's global secrets (GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET, GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) and dispatches into all routes — except those of isolated groups without a bound source. GitHub App installations deliver here; use installationId on groups to keep tenants isolated.

Per-Group Endpoint (POST /webhook/{groupId})

Every group can opt into its own webhook ingress with an independent secret (generated from the group page — Webhook endpoint panel, owner role). Payloads are verified against the group's secret instead of the global ones, and only that group's routes are eligible. This is how SaaS users configure Gitea, classic GitHub, or custom webhooks without sharing (or knowing) the operator's secrets.

  • Supported for any provider: GitHub (X-Hub-Signature-256), Gitea (X-Gitea-Signature), custom (X-WebHooker-Signature)
  • The secret is a 64-char hex string stored with the group in D1 (it is never sent to the console after generation); regenerating invalidates the old one immediately, and only a current owner can rotate or remove it
  • Delivery-id dedup keys are provider- and tenant-scoped (delivery:{provider}:@i:{instance}:{id} — the group's immutable instance, so a rename keeps the scope and a group re-created under the same id never shares it; the global endpoint uses the scope @global)
  • When the group has no secret (or no longer exists) the endpoint returns 404; when the group's stored configuration cannot be read it returns 503
  • A tenant-signed payload is only as trustworthy as the tenant: its installation.id is ignored, so it never uses the operator's GitHub App credentials (no job/build-log enrichment) and never provisions or rebinds installation groups; the installation restriction does not apply to the group's own ingress

Custom Webhooks

Post a JSON object to POST /webhook/{groupId} (or the global endpoint) with the body signed as X-WebHooker-Signature: sha256=<hmac-sha256 hex of the raw body> using the group's secret (a top-level array or scalar is rejected with 400). The payload becomes a custom event that flows through the normal route pipeline — create a route with event: custom (there is a console template) and it dispatches to that route's targets, records send_logs, and appears in the group's webhook log channel.

Replay Protection

Custom webhooks support optional replay protection via two extra headers alongside the signature:

  • X-WebHooker-Timestamp — Unix seconds the request was sent
  • X-WebHooker-Nonce — a unique, unpredictable value per request (e.g. a UUID)

When both headers are present, the signature is computed over {timestamp}.{nonce}.{rawBody} instead of the raw body, and the request is accepted only if:

  1. The timestamp is within ±5 minutes of the server clock (rejects replays and clock-drift abusers)
  2. The nonce has never been seen before for this secret (claimed atomically and kept for 10 minutes; a replayed nonce is rejected, while another tenant may use the same nonce). A nonce whose first request is still being processed, or a failure of the nonce store, answers 503 instead of 401, so the sender retries
input="${timestamp}.${nonce}.${body}"
signature="sha256=$(printf '%s' "$input" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$secret" -hex | sed 's/.*= //')"

When the headers are omitted, WebHooker falls back to the legacy body-only signature, so existing senders keep working unchanged.

Payload schema:

{
  "title": "Deploy failed",
  "description": "Prod rollout failed at 12:03 UTC",
  "color": "red",
  "url": "https://ci.example.com/runs/42",
  "repo": "acme/widget",
  "author": {
    "name": "alice",
    "iconUrl": "https://…/alice.png",
    "url": "https://github.com/alice"
  },
  "fields": [{ "name": "Env", "value": "prod", "inline": true }],
  "footer": "my-monitor",
  "deliveryId": "alert-123"
}
Field Type Description
title string Message title (falls back to "Custom message")
description string Optional message body
color string Optional embed color: a word (red, green, yellow, blue, purple, orange, cyan, gray) or #rrggbb
url string Optional link for the title
repo string Optional owner/repo; prefixes the title and is used as the footer
author object Optional { name, iconUrl, url }
fields object[] Optional embed fields { name, value, inline }
footer string Optional footer override
deliveryId string Optional id for sender-side dedup (retries). Without a deliveryId the nonce identifies the request; with neither, a retried request is delivered again

GitHub App Tenant Isolation

When the GitHub App is installed, its events arrive at the global endpoint for every installation. To keep tenants apart, bind each group to the installation id that should feed it: "installationId": 12345678. The id is visible in the App's installation webhook payload (installation.id) or on the GitHub App installation page URL. Events from any other installation are rejected for that group even if its owners list is empty. Groups without installationId keep the legacy behavior (owners filtering).

Binding is auto-configured — the GitHub App's Setup URL should point to {BASE_URL}/auth/github/install. Right after a user installs the App, the browser lands there (the page requires a signed-in admin session — not signed in users are redirected through the OAuth flow first) and they choose where the installation binds: a new group (inst-{installationId}, default) or any existing group they own (owner role checked again on submit; POST /auth/github/install/bind performs the provisioning). No manual id entry is needed.

The installation_id in the Setup URL can be set to anything, so both the page and the bind step first verify — with the signed-in user's own GitHub token — that the user may manage that installation: they are the installation's own account, or an active admin of its organization (merely having access to it as a collaborator is not enough). Otherwise they are sent back with ?error=install-forbidden. Super admins may bind any installation. With ALLOW_SELF_SIGNUP, the installer becomes owner of the dedicated inst-{installationId} group only while it is bound to that installation and has no members yet — no other group is ever handed to a new owner this way. Ids starting with inst- or u- are reserved for these system groups: only super admins may create or rename groups to them, and an existing unbound inst-* group is never bound automatically.

As a fallback (e.g. when the Setup URL is not configured), the installation.created webhook event — on the global endpoint only — creates/binds the group automatically: existing groups whose owners match the installing account are bound, otherwise a dedicated inst-{installationId} group is created. Then just add routes/members in the console. The provisioning runs after the delivery's dedup check and is recorded per installation and per bound group for 7 days, so a redelivered event never re-binds a group a super admin has unbound since; if provisioning fails, the endpoint answers 503 so the event is redelivered.

To show the installing account's login on the choice page, set GITHUB_APP_ID and GITHUB_PRIVATE_KEY — see Secrets.