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Webhook Ingress & Tenancy

Webhook Providers

WebHooker ingests webhooks from multiple forges through the same POST /webhook endpoint; the provider is auto-detected from the request headers, so point every forge's webhook at {BASE_URL}/webhook.

Provider Event header Signature header Signature format Secret
GitHub X-GitHub-Event X-Hub-Signature-256 sha256=<hex> HMAC-SHA256 GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET
Gitea X-Gitea-Event X-Gitea-Signature plain hex HMAC-SHA256 GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET

Delivery-id dedup uses X-GitHub-Delivery (GitHub) or X-Gitea-Delivery (Gitea) when present.

With the delivery queue enabled, a webhook is acknowledged (200) only after it was durably enqueued. If the queue rejects it, the endpoint answers 503 and releases the dedup claim, so the sender's redelivery is accepted instead of being dropped as a duplicate. A redelivery of a webhook that was already accepted answers 200 { "duplicate": true }; one that arrives while the first copy is still being processed answers 503, so the sender tries again later.

Without the queue binding, the webhook is dispatched inline and answered only once dispatch finished: 200 when every target was handled, 503 when a target failed transiently (the sender's redelivery then skips the targets that already succeeded). Inline dispatch stops sending after 8 minutes and answers 503 for the rest, so one request never outlives its dedup claim.

Gitea payloads are normalized to the same internal shape as GitHub events, so routes, filters, and the 28 formatters work unchanged. Unknown or unmapped Gitea events fall back to the generic formatter. Repository/commit/user links are derived from the payload's repository.html_url, so they point at your Gitea instance.

Global Endpoint (POST /webhook)

The global endpoint verifies payloads against the operator's global secrets (GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET, GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET) and dispatches into all routes — except those of isolated groups without a bound source. GitHub App installations deliver here; use installationId on groups to keep tenants isolated.

Per-Group Endpoint (POST /webhook/{groupId})

Every group can opt into its own webhook ingress with an independent secret (generated from the group page — Webhook endpoint panel, owner role). Payloads are verified against the group's secret instead of the global ones, and only that group's routes are eligible. This is how SaaS users configure Gitea, classic GitHub, or custom webhooks without sharing (or knowing) the operator's secrets.

  • Supported for any provider: GitHub (X-Hub-Signature-256), Gitea (X-Gitea-Signature), custom (X-WebHooker-Signature)
  • The secret is a 64-char hex string stored with the group in D1 (it is never sent to the console after generation); regenerating invalidates the old one immediately, and only a current owner can rotate or remove it
  • Delivery-id dedup keys are provider- and tenant-scoped (delivery:{provider}:@i:{instance}:{id} — the group's immutable instance, so a rename keeps the scope and a group re-created under the same id never shares it; the global endpoint uses the scope @global)
  • When the group has no secret (or no longer exists) the endpoint returns 404; when the group's stored configuration cannot be read it returns 503
  • A tenant-signed payload is only as trustworthy as the tenant: its installation.id is ignored, so it never uses the operator's GitHub App credentials (no job/build-log enrichment) and never provisions or rebinds installation groups; the installation restriction does not apply to the group's own ingress

Custom Webhooks

Post a JSON object to POST /webhook/{groupId} (or the global endpoint) with the body signed as X-WebHooker-Signature: sha256=<hmac-sha256 hex of the raw body> using the group's secret (a top-level array or scalar is rejected with 400). The payload becomes a custom event that flows through the normal route pipeline — create a route with event: custom (there is a console template) and it dispatches to that route's targets, records send_logs, and appears in the group's webhook log channel.

Replay Protection

Custom webhooks support optional replay protection via two extra headers alongside the signature:

  • X-WebHooker-Timestamp — Unix seconds the request was sent
  • X-WebHooker-Nonce — a unique, unpredictable value per request (e.g. a UUID)

When both headers are present, the signature is computed over {timestamp}.{nonce}.{rawBody} instead of the raw body, and the request is accepted only if:

  1. The timestamp is within ±5 minutes of the server clock (rejects replays and clock-drift abusers)
  2. The nonce has never been seen before for this secret (claimed atomically and kept for 10 minutes; a replayed nonce is rejected, while another tenant may use the same nonce). A nonce whose first request is still being processed, or a failure of the nonce store, answers 503 instead of 401, so the sender retries
input="${timestamp}.${nonce}.${body}"
signature="sha256=$(printf '%s' "$input" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$secret" -hex | sed 's/.*= //')"

When the headers are omitted, WebHooker falls back to the legacy body-only signature, so existing senders keep working unchanged.

Payload schema:

{
  "title": "Deploy failed",
  "description": "Prod rollout failed at 12:03 UTC",
  "color": "red",
  "url": "https://ci.example.com/runs/42",
  "repo": "acme/widget",
  "author": {
    "name": "alice",
    "iconUrl": "https://…/alice.png",
    "url": "https://github.com/alice"
  },
  "fields": [{ "name": "Env", "value": "prod", "inline": true }],
  "footer": "my-monitor",
  "deliveryId": "alert-123"
}
Field Type Description
title string Message title (falls back to "Custom message")
description string Optional message body
color string Optional embed color: a word (red, green, yellow, blue, purple, orange, cyan, gray) or #rrggbb
url string Optional link for the title
repo string Optional owner/repo; prefixes the title and is used as the footer
author object Optional { name, iconUrl, url }
fields object[] Optional embed fields { name, value, inline }
footer string Optional footer override
deliveryId string Optional id for sender-side dedup (retries). Without a deliveryId the nonce identifies the request; with neither, a retried request is delivered again

GitHub App Tenant Isolation

When the GitHub App is installed, its events arrive at the global endpoint for every installation. To keep tenants apart, bind each group to the installation id that should feed it: "installationId": 12345678. The id is visible in the App's installation webhook payload (installation.id) or on the GitHub App installation page URL. Events from any other installation are rejected for that group even if its owners list is empty. Groups without installationId keep the legacy behavior (owners filtering).

Binding is auto-configured — the GitHub App's Setup URL should point to {BASE_URL}/auth/github/install. Right after a user installs the App, the browser lands there (the page requires a signed-in admin session — not signed in users are redirected through the OAuth flow first) and they choose where the installation binds: a new group (inst-{installationId}, default) or any existing group they own (owner role checked again on submit; POST /auth/github/install/bind performs the provisioning). No manual id entry is needed.

The installation_id in the Setup URL can be set to anything, so both the page and the bind step first verify — with the signed-in user's own GitHub token — that the user may manage that installation: they are the installation's own account, or an active admin of its organization (merely having access to it as a collaborator is not enough). Otherwise they are sent back with ?error=install-forbidden. Super admins may bind any installation. With ALLOW_SELF_SIGNUP, the installer becomes owner of the dedicated inst-{installationId} group only while it is bound to that installation and has no members yet — no other group is ever handed to a new owner this way. Ids starting with inst- or u- are reserved for these system groups: only super admins may create or rename groups to them, and an existing unbound inst-* group is never bound automatically.

As a fallback (e.g. when the Setup URL is not configured), the installation.created webhook event — on the global endpoint only — creates/binds the group automatically: existing groups whose owners match the installing account are bound, otherwise a dedicated inst-{installationId} group is created. Then just add routes/members in the console. The provisioning runs after the delivery's dedup check and is recorded per installation and per bound group for 7 days, so a redelivered event never re-binds a group a super admin has unbound since; if provisioning fails, the endpoint answers 503 so the event is redelivered.

To show the installing account's login on the choice page, set GITHUB_APP_ID and GITHUB_PRIVATE_KEY — see Secrets.