Files
WebHooker/docs/guide/groups.md
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翅膀喵andRhenCloud 978c53eeb3 fix(security): harden webhook delivery pipeline and group storage (#11)
* fix(log): preserve structured error details

Error objects lose their useful details when serialized as plain JSON.
Keep the message, stack and cause in structured log output.

* fix(runtime): bound shared in-flight waits

A canceled request can leave its shared promise pending forever.
Bound joins and coordinate a single replacement so later requests
make progress without multiplying upstream work.

* fix(bot): reject oversized callback bodies

Reject declared oversized bot callbacks before reading their bodies.
This keeps unauthenticated requests from wasting worker resources.

* test(d1): exercise real sqlite transactions

Exercise real foreign keys, transactions and conditional statements
instead of mocks that cannot reproduce lost updates or cascades.

* fix(storage): preserve claims across kv fallback

Only missing tables justify KV fallback; other failures must surface.
Remember fallback writes so migration to D1 cannot forget claims
and replay completed work. Share marker checks without extra writes.

* fix(filter): use isolated linear-time patterns

Backtracking patterns can exhaust worker CPU on untrusted payloads.
Use linear-time matching and separate bounded cache namespaces so
glob and regex entries cannot corrupt each other.

* fix(filter): read each event branch correctly

Deployment and check branches live in event-specific nested fields.
Read those fields and remove only the actual leading ref prefix.

* fix(filter): read only own payload properties

Inherited object properties are not webhook payload data.
Read own properties only so JSONPath cannot traverse prototypes.

* fix(filter): validate executable condition trees

Malformed trees and unsupported patterns must not silently turn an
exclude rule into a pass. Validate the shape and only the patterns
the evaluator actually executes.

* fix(i18n): bound and cache translation loads

Repeated misses and simultaneous override loads spend KV reads for
the same language. Cache confirmed misses and share bounded loads
without caching read failures as missing translations.

* i18n(bot): explain command and account failures

Explain account linking, command failures and skipped delivery
outcomes consistently in both supported languages.

* fix(github): bound and reuse app token fetches

Repeated token exchanges waste requests and JWT work for every event.
Reuse valid installation tokens, share refreshes and back off briefly
after failures while keeping every shared wait bounded.

* fix(github): restrict enrichment request urls

Webhook-provided URLs must never receive an installation token on
another host. Restrict enrichment to GitHub repository API paths,
reject redirects and bound optional requests.

* fix(formatter): preserve invalid code points

Out-of-range numeric entities can throw while formatting a delivery.
Keep invalid code points verbatim instead of aborting the message.

* fix(formatter): preserve bounded markdown text

Code spans, fences, indentation and autolinks are Markdown content,
not HTML tags to strip. Preserve them while bounding cleanup input
and reusing results across routes for the same event.

* fix(formatter): strip only leading ref prefixes

A short branch or tag may itself contain refs/heads or refs/tags.
Strip one leading full-ref prefix at the caller and keep short names
unchanged when generating labels and links.

* fix(gitea): link push authors to their forge

A Gitea author is not the same-named GitHub account.
Build author profile links from the originating forge.

* fix(formatter): render deployment state values

The deployment status object stringifies as [object Object].
Render its actual state in the status field.

* fix(formatter): read security severity levels

The scanner severity is not the security severity of an alert.
Prefer the security level so critical and high alerts get the right
label and color.

* fix(formatter): hide actions on other forges

Action buttons call the GitHub API as the linked user.
Hide them for other forges to avoid operating on a same-named
GitHub repository.

* fix(check): isolate updates by check suite

Same-named checks from different suites must not edit one message.
Include the suite or app identity and retain the former key for
controlled adoption of existing tracked messages.

* fix(logs): scope queries before limiting results

Filter authorized groups in SQL before LIMIT and aggregate only
visible rows. Preserve current group attribution for late writes,
surface read failures and combine related totals in one scan.

* perf(d1): index pruning and failed send queries

Pruning and failure views should not scan all historical rows.
Index the high-value access paths without adding a write-heavy
index for infrequent delivery-detail lookups.

* fix(discord): bound individual api requests

An unbounded API request can outlive an update-chain lock.
Bound each request so another holder cannot race a late edit.

* fix(discord): defer long rate-limit waits

Long rate-limit sleeps block delivery progress inside a worker.
Return a retryable 429 for the queue when the wait exceeds the bound.

* fix(discord): encode channel path segments

Stored channel and message ids are path segments, not URL paths.
Encode them so aliases cannot address another Discord resource.

* fix(discord): reuse nonces after lost responses

A successful create may lose its response. Reuse a stable nonce
with enforce_nonce so retries recover that message instead of
posting duplicates or accepting an unreadable success.

* fix(discord): constrain embeds and role mentions

Respect combined embed and component limits as well as field caps.
Restrict allowed mentions to validated route roles so payload text
cannot notify everyone.

* fix(discord): resume bounded command syncs

Application changes, command rollbacks and large guild lists can
leave commands stale indefinitely. Track the current hash per app
and resume bounded paginated work without needless KV writes.

* fix(github): verify installation management

An installation id is user-controlled, and repository access is not
installation management. Verify the owning account or an active
organization admin using the user token and read:org scope.

* fix(github): resolve immutable member ids

A login can be renamed and reclaimed before its first sign-in.
Resolve the current immutable user id when membership is granted
so a future holder of the login cannot inherit access.

* fix(auth): revoke stale sessions and tokens

Revoked or rotated credentials must stop working despite stale KV
replicas. Track the live token and revocations in D1 and preserve
immutable identity bindings rather than trusting a recycled login.

* fix(auth): bind sessions and tokens to identity

Automatic retries can repeat non-idempotent user actions.
Disable those retries and expose a write hook so bot handlers can
record completion immediately before the GitHub write.

* fix(discord): defer and deduplicate interactions

Acknowledge slow actions before Discord times out and deduplicate
interaction writes. Preserve comment text and reject edits whose
source changed after the modal opened.

* fix(telegram): always verify webhook secrets

Webhook verification must not silently disable itself when the
optional secret is absent. Derive a stable secret from the bot
token and reject callbacks when verification is unavailable.

* fix(telegram): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(telegram): honor nested rate-limit delays

Telegram places retry_after inside parameters, not at the top level.
Read that value and defer long waits to the delivery queue.

* fix(telegram): report unreadable send results

An unreadable successful response may already have sent the message.
Report an explicit uncertain result instead of retrying a create
without an idempotency key or pretending it succeeded.

* fix(telegram): keep editable messages as text

Guessing photo versus text from message content makes later edits
use the wrong API and a smaller caption budget. Always send text
and use the avatar as a link preview.

* fix(telegram): render hard breaks as newlines

Telegram HTML does not support br tags. Render Markdown hard breaks
as plain newlines so otherwise valid messages are accepted.

* fix(telegram): clamp visible html characters

Telegram counts visible characters, not HTML source bytes.
Truncate without splitting tags, entities or surrogate pairs.

* fix(telegram): honor the author emoji toggle

The author marker must obey the group emoji preference just like
formatter-added decoration.

* fix(telegram): keep completed commands claimed

Redelivery after a completed write must never post another comment.
Keep completion claims despite reply failures, scope updates per bot
and only issue account-login links in private chats.

* fix(feishu): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(feishu): classify retryable api failures

Business error codes can be transient even in HTTP 200 responses.
Classify token and rate-limit errors for retry and defer long waits.

* fix(feishu): retry sends with stable uuids

An unreadable response does not prove a send failed.
Reuse the same uuid for retries so recovering the result cannot
create a second Feishu message.

* fix(feishu): refresh and evict tokens safely

Separate app token caches, stop reusing refused tokens and share
refreshes. Cache failures briefly and keep valid tokens in memory
when a best-effort KV cache write fails.

* fix(feishu): use the card update endpoint

Delayed card updates use the card update endpoint; the config
endpoint cannot update an interaction response.

* fix(feishu): neutralize untrusted mentions

Forge text is untrusted and can contain at-all tags.
Neutralize mentions in card bodies and footers before rendering.

* fix(feishu): authenticate and dedupe callbacks

Authenticate signed or token-verified callbacks before dispatching
commands. Decode encrypted envelopes and handle card actions using
the correct fields without claiming irrelevant chat events.

* fix(target): normalize actual destinations

Different target spellings can name the same actual destination.
Normalize channel, thread and topic identities for ownership checks
and per-route duplicate suppression.

* fix(config): transact per-group configuration

Whole-table writes and cached snapshots can overwrite other groups
or resurrect removed configuration. Use per-group guarded writes,
one-time identity migration and explicit unreadable-row failures.

* fix(group): preserve identity through lifecycle

Group names are mutable and reusable, so they cannot own durable
state. Preserve immutable identities across lifecycle operations and
commit invite use with membership under transaction-time guards.

* fix(oauth): confirm account links and installs

A login link or installation id is not proof of account ownership.
Verify installation management, bind browser state and require an
explicit account-link confirmation before granting chat access.

* fix(queue): fence leases and record target outcomes

Retries must remember completed targets and distinguish active
lease holders. Fence state updates, preserve permanent outcomes and
reject missing parked payloads instead of dispatching empty data.

* fix(dispatch): isolate and resume tenant sends

Check tenant sources before filters and never dispatch orphan routes.
Record each target outcome, isolate update chains by forge and group
identity, and keep stale events from overwriting newer messages.

* fix(queue): bound batches and resume deliveries

A queue invocation has shared query and subrequest limits.
Use a small batch and shared send budget, renew fenced leases and
resume only unfinished work without exhausting unstarted messages.

* fix(admin): guard revisions and tenant targets

Read-time authorization alone cannot protect concurrent edits.
Guard revisions, current roles and destination ownership in the
write transaction, and use per-group endpoints for isolated changes.

* fix(webhook): confirm only accepted deliveries

Acknowledging before queue acceptance permanently loses deliveries.
Confirm only accepted work, release failed claims, scope replay
identities and strip tenant-supplied installation authority.

* fix(storage): prune abandoned parked payloads

Oversized payloads can remain after interrupted enqueue attempts.
Prune objects beyond their retry lifetime without deleting payloads
that a current delivery may still need.

* fix(console): expose api conflict statuses

Callers need the HTTP status to distinguish stale edits from other
failures and reload current data after a conflict.

* refactor(console): model group revisions

Carry server revisions explicitly so console writes can reject
changes based on an outdated group snapshot.

* fix(console): send loaded route revisions

Send the revision actually loaded with the route list and adopt the
server response after a save. Reload on conflict instead of silently
overwriting another editor.

* fix(console): guard fragment saves by revision

Fragments share a group version with other configuration writes.
Submit the loaded revision and reload on conflict to preserve
concurrent edits.

* fix(console): save groups with guarded writes

Whole-list saves can overwrite unrelated groups. Use per-group
revision-aware writes, retain rename results and confirm deletion
on the exact group, routes and version shown to the user.

* fix(console): reject edits of stale routes

A conflict reload can leave an older route editor open.
Compare its original value before saving so it cannot overwrite
the newly loaded route.

* fix(console): show overview loading failures

Failed overview requests must not look like an empty dashboard or
a successful refresh. Show the reason while retaining prior data.

* fix(console): explain rejected install bindings

Explain why an installation binding was refused instead of silently
returning to the console with no visible outcome.

* fix(console): allow selecting a group named all

The all sentinel collides with a valid group id.
Use a value that cannot be a group id so that group stays selectable.

* fix(console): discard stale log detail responses

An older detail request can finish after a newer selection or close.
Discard it so the dialog never shows the previously clicked record.

* fix(console): retain legacy group owners

Groups predating member roles store owners in adminIds.
Load those as owners so adding a member never drops all old owners.

* fix(console): lock member edits during saves

Edits made during a save are overwritten by its result.
Disable member controls and guard handlers until the write settles.

* fix(console): show invite loading failures

Failed invite loads must not look like no pending invites.
Show the error and discard responses from a previously shown group.

* fix(console): retain legacy discord log targets

A stored log target without platform means Discord.
Keep that meaning in the editor instead of clearing the target.

* fix(console): retain undisplayed forge sources

An editor that only displays some providers must preserve the others.
Keep stored custom sources when saving unrelated group settings.

* fix(console): lock the group editor while saving

Prevent edits while a group save is in flight and make super-only
installation settings readonly instead of silently ignoring edits.

* fix(console): lock route edits and show failures

Lock the route editor while saving and show fragment load failures
with a retry action rather than presenting a false empty list.

* fix(config): expose the legal contact override

Declare the public runtime key so the documented environment
override reaches legal pages in deployed Nuxt builds.

* build(deploy): migrate d1 before deployment

Apply pending D1 migrations before deploying code that requires
them. Stop deployment when migration fails instead of running
against an incomplete schema.

* docs(worker): align guides with runtime behavior

Synchronize both language guides, API references and examples with
the implemented authorization, storage and delivery behavior.
Document migration requirements and accepted operational limits.

* fix(storage): repair orphaned KV routes

Repair orphaned KV routes before serving KV-only configuration.

* fix(security): fully escape forge HTML

---------

Co-authored-by: RhenCloud <i@rhen.cloud>
2026-10-24 16:19:06 +08:00

12 KiB
Raw Blame History

Groups & Access Control

Routes belong to groups. Groups scope admin access and can restrict which events flow into them. They are stored in D1 (d1_groups, seeded from the legacy KV config:groups key on first load), managed via the Web UI or the Admin API. The bulk groups write accepts at most 100 groups per save.

Group Schema

{
  "id": "backend-team",
  "name": "Backend Team",
  "members": [
    { "login": "rhencloud", "role": "owner" },
    { "login": "octobot", "role": "admin" },
    { "login": "reader", "role": "viewer" }
  ],
  "owners": ["myorg"],
  "providers": ["github", "gitea"],
  "installationId": 12345678,
  "logTarget": { "platform": "discord", "channelId": "123456789", "threadId": "987654321" }
}
Field Type Required Description
id string Yes Lowercase id (a-z0-9, -); referenced by each route's groupId. Editable: renaming re-points its routes, fragments, history, webhook secret and pending invites; a deleted or renamed id stays retired for a few days
name string Yes Human-readable group name
members object[] Yes¹ { login, role } entries; role is owner, admin, or viewer. Each entry is bound to a GitHub user id by the server (resolved when the member is added, or at their first sign-in); a bound entry matches only that account, even after the login changes hands
adminIds string[] No Deprecated legacy field; treated as members with role owner when present
owners string[] No Org/user logins whose events are accepted into this group; empty = all
providers string[] No Source platforms allowed into this group (github, gitea, custom); empty = all
installationId number No GitHub App installation id bound to this group; only that installation's events are accepted (empty = all). Super-admin only (set by the verified install flow)
isolated boolean No Isolated groups (self sign-up personal groups) only receive events from their own /webhook/{groupId} ingress until a super admin binds a source (installationId or owners). Super-admin only
emoji boolean No Whether to include emoji in this group's messages (default true)
forgeSources object[] No Forge hosts: { host, type, name? } entries (type is github or gitea, name is an optional display label) that label this group's message footers; empty = no label
lang string No Message language for every route in this group (e.g. en, zh; custom via KV i18n:<lang>) — see Message Language — defaults to en
logTarget object No Webhook log channel: a Discord { platform, channelId, threadId? }, Telegram { platform, chatId, topicId? } or Feishu { platform, chatId } target that receives a summary of every webhook the group's routes dispatch

¹ members or the legacy adminIds must be present. A non-empty members list needs at least one owner; an empty list is allowed (only super admins manage such a group). forgeSources takes at most 20 entries, each name at most 50 characters, and no two entries with the same type and host.

Roles

Every group member has one of three roles. Super admins (ADMIN_USER_IDS) always bypass them.

Role View routes/logs Edit routes Manage members & invites Edit group settings
owner ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ (except owners)
admin ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
viewer ✓ (read-only) ✗ ✗ ✗

Access Model

  • Super admins (ADMIN_USER_IDS) see and edit every group and all routes; only they can edit a group's source-isolation fields (owners, installationId, isolated) — an owner's save keeps the stored values.
  • Owners manage their group's routes, members, invites, name, id, emoji, and providers. They cannot remove the last owner or demote themselves when no other owner remains.
  • Admins edit routes inside their groups and view logs; viewers get a read-only console.
  • Group admin endpoints operate on a single group at a time via /admin/api/groups/:id/routes; groupId is forced from the path parameter.
  • The owners list restricts the group's routes to events of repositories owned by these users or organizations (repository.owner.login / organization.login); to filter by who triggered an event, use an actor filter.
  • A route whose group no longer exists never fires.
  • Every group write is a single-row, compare-and-swap update: two people editing different groups never overwrite each other, and an edit made from a stale copy of the same group is refused (409, the console reloads) instead of reverting the newer change. Route and fragment lists work the same way per group.
  • Roles are checked again inside the write itself: a request authorized before the writer lost their role (or was removed) is refused when it commits.
  • Deleting a group requires the confirmation snapshot the console shows (revision, routesRevision and the group version): anything added or changed after the confirmation — a route, a fragment, a setting — makes the delete fail with 409 instead of being deleted unseen. A group with routes that cannot be read is not deleted.
  • Delivery targets are owned: a non-super admin cannot point routes or the log channel at a channel/chat another group already delivers to, unless they may edit that group's routes too (403). A channel that two groups already shared before keeps working only where it is already used.
  • The providers list restricts which forge's events (github, gitea) the group's routes will dispatch. This lets you keep GitHub and Gitea groups separate even when org/user names collide.

Webhook Log Channel

A group may set logTarget to a Discord channel/thread, Telegram chat/topic or Feishu chat. Whenever the group's routes dispatch a webhook, a single summary message is sent there: the event type/action, the repo, the delivery id, and one line per route×target with an ✅/❌ outcome (including the error for failed sends; targets finished by an earlier attempt are listed as such; at most the first 10 lines are listed, the rest is summarized as +N). The message is green when every dispatch succeeded, red when any failed, and gray when earlier attempts' outcomes are not known. A retried delivery with the same outcome does not send the summary again. The summary uses the group's message language. Log messages are sent best-effort and are not themselves recorded in the D1 send log.

Forge Source Label

A group defines the forges it receives events from via forgeSources, a list of { host, type, name? } entries (type is github or gitea). Every message this group's routes send carries the footer label of the first entry whose type matches the event's provider and whose host matches the repository URL's hostname (GitHub events match github.com). The label is the entry's optional name — falling back to the host — so two self-hosted Gitea instances can be shown as "内网 Gitea" / "Git2 仓库" while matched by their distinct hosts:

{
  "forgeSources": [
    { "host": "github.com", "type": "github", "name": "GitHub 主站" },
    { "host": "git1.example.com", "type": "gitea", "name": "内网 Gitea" },
    { "host": "git2.example.com", "type": "gitea" }
  ]
}
  • Discord — the embed footer shows the label next to the repo (内网 Gitea · acme/widget) with a site icon as the footer icon: GitHub's fluidicon.png or the Gitea instance's /assets/img/favicon.png (both raster PNGs — Discord silently ignores .ico favicons).
  • Telegram — the footer line starts with the hyperlinked label ([内网 Gitea](https://git1.example.com)).
  • Events whose repository host has no matching entry (e.g. custom webhooks, or a repo hosted elsewhere) get no label.

The label is independent of Group.emoji and follows every message that group dispatches (including in-place edits of workflow/check messages).

Invites

Owners (and super admins) can create single-use invite links valid for 7 days from the group's Members panel. Accepting an invite adds the user with the invited role (admin or viewer — never owner); an existing viewer is upgraded to admin. Invites are stored in KV as invite:{token} for their whole lifetime; the "used" record commits in the same D1 transaction as the membership change, so a link can be used only once even when two people open it at the same time.

  • An invite belongs to the group instance that issued it: a group later created under the same id never accepts it.
  • Revoking an invite is recorded in D1 and takes effect at once, even where KV still has the invite.
  • An invite stops working when its issuer is no longer an owner of the group.
  • If the login is still on a member entry bound to another GitHub account (the former holder of that login), accepting fails with a conflict and the invite stays usable; an owner first removes the stale entry.

Self Sign-up

With ALLOW_SELF_SIGNUP=1, a GitHub user who has no group access gets a personal group (u-{userId}, owned by them) on first login instead of a 403. This is the entry point for a fully self-service SaaS install; disable it to keep the console invite-only.

Personal groups are isolated (groups named u-<digits> created before the flag existed count as isolated too, unless a super admin sets isolated: false): the operator's global POST /webhook endpoint never dispatches to them, so a self-service user cannot receive other tenants' events by adding a catch-all route. They receive events through their own per-group webhook — or from a GitHub App installation they prove they administer (the install flow checks it with the user's own GitHub token).