Files
WebHooker/server/lib/drivers/telegram/commands.ts
T
翅膀喵andRhenCloud 978c53eeb3 fix(security): harden webhook delivery pipeline and group storage (#11)
* fix(log): preserve structured error details

Error objects lose their useful details when serialized as plain JSON.
Keep the message, stack and cause in structured log output.

* fix(runtime): bound shared in-flight waits

A canceled request can leave its shared promise pending forever.
Bound joins and coordinate a single replacement so later requests
make progress without multiplying upstream work.

* fix(bot): reject oversized callback bodies

Reject declared oversized bot callbacks before reading their bodies.
This keeps unauthenticated requests from wasting worker resources.

* test(d1): exercise real sqlite transactions

Exercise real foreign keys, transactions and conditional statements
instead of mocks that cannot reproduce lost updates or cascades.

* fix(storage): preserve claims across kv fallback

Only missing tables justify KV fallback; other failures must surface.
Remember fallback writes so migration to D1 cannot forget claims
and replay completed work. Share marker checks without extra writes.

* fix(filter): use isolated linear-time patterns

Backtracking patterns can exhaust worker CPU on untrusted payloads.
Use linear-time matching and separate bounded cache namespaces so
glob and regex entries cannot corrupt each other.

* fix(filter): read each event branch correctly

Deployment and check branches live in event-specific nested fields.
Read those fields and remove only the actual leading ref prefix.

* fix(filter): read only own payload properties

Inherited object properties are not webhook payload data.
Read own properties only so JSONPath cannot traverse prototypes.

* fix(filter): validate executable condition trees

Malformed trees and unsupported patterns must not silently turn an
exclude rule into a pass. Validate the shape and only the patterns
the evaluator actually executes.

* fix(i18n): bound and cache translation loads

Repeated misses and simultaneous override loads spend KV reads for
the same language. Cache confirmed misses and share bounded loads
without caching read failures as missing translations.

* i18n(bot): explain command and account failures

Explain account linking, command failures and skipped delivery
outcomes consistently in both supported languages.

* fix(github): bound and reuse app token fetches

Repeated token exchanges waste requests and JWT work for every event.
Reuse valid installation tokens, share refreshes and back off briefly
after failures while keeping every shared wait bounded.

* fix(github): restrict enrichment request urls

Webhook-provided URLs must never receive an installation token on
another host. Restrict enrichment to GitHub repository API paths,
reject redirects and bound optional requests.

* fix(formatter): preserve invalid code points

Out-of-range numeric entities can throw while formatting a delivery.
Keep invalid code points verbatim instead of aborting the message.

* fix(formatter): preserve bounded markdown text

Code spans, fences, indentation and autolinks are Markdown content,
not HTML tags to strip. Preserve them while bounding cleanup input
and reusing results across routes for the same event.

* fix(formatter): strip only leading ref prefixes

A short branch or tag may itself contain refs/heads or refs/tags.
Strip one leading full-ref prefix at the caller and keep short names
unchanged when generating labels and links.

* fix(gitea): link push authors to their forge

A Gitea author is not the same-named GitHub account.
Build author profile links from the originating forge.

* fix(formatter): render deployment state values

The deployment status object stringifies as [object Object].
Render its actual state in the status field.

* fix(formatter): read security severity levels

The scanner severity is not the security severity of an alert.
Prefer the security level so critical and high alerts get the right
label and color.

* fix(formatter): hide actions on other forges

Action buttons call the GitHub API as the linked user.
Hide them for other forges to avoid operating on a same-named
GitHub repository.

* fix(check): isolate updates by check suite

Same-named checks from different suites must not edit one message.
Include the suite or app identity and retain the former key for
controlled adoption of existing tracked messages.

* fix(logs): scope queries before limiting results

Filter authorized groups in SQL before LIMIT and aggregate only
visible rows. Preserve current group attribution for late writes,
surface read failures and combine related totals in one scan.

* perf(d1): index pruning and failed send queries

Pruning and failure views should not scan all historical rows.
Index the high-value access paths without adding a write-heavy
index for infrequent delivery-detail lookups.

* fix(discord): bound individual api requests

An unbounded API request can outlive an update-chain lock.
Bound each request so another holder cannot race a late edit.

* fix(discord): defer long rate-limit waits

Long rate-limit sleeps block delivery progress inside a worker.
Return a retryable 429 for the queue when the wait exceeds the bound.

* fix(discord): encode channel path segments

Stored channel and message ids are path segments, not URL paths.
Encode them so aliases cannot address another Discord resource.

* fix(discord): reuse nonces after lost responses

A successful create may lose its response. Reuse a stable nonce
with enforce_nonce so retries recover that message instead of
posting duplicates or accepting an unreadable success.

* fix(discord): constrain embeds and role mentions

Respect combined embed and component limits as well as field caps.
Restrict allowed mentions to validated route roles so payload text
cannot notify everyone.

* fix(discord): resume bounded command syncs

Application changes, command rollbacks and large guild lists can
leave commands stale indefinitely. Track the current hash per app
and resume bounded paginated work without needless KV writes.

* fix(github): verify installation management

An installation id is user-controlled, and repository access is not
installation management. Verify the owning account or an active
organization admin using the user token and read:org scope.

* fix(github): resolve immutable member ids

A login can be renamed and reclaimed before its first sign-in.
Resolve the current immutable user id when membership is granted
so a future holder of the login cannot inherit access.

* fix(auth): revoke stale sessions and tokens

Revoked or rotated credentials must stop working despite stale KV
replicas. Track the live token and revocations in D1 and preserve
immutable identity bindings rather than trusting a recycled login.

* fix(auth): bind sessions and tokens to identity

Automatic retries can repeat non-idempotent user actions.
Disable those retries and expose a write hook so bot handlers can
record completion immediately before the GitHub write.

* fix(discord): defer and deduplicate interactions

Acknowledge slow actions before Discord times out and deduplicate
interaction writes. Preserve comment text and reject edits whose
source changed after the modal opened.

* fix(telegram): always verify webhook secrets

Webhook verification must not silently disable itself when the
optional secret is absent. Derive a stable secret from the bot
token and reject callbacks when verification is unavailable.

* fix(telegram): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(telegram): honor nested rate-limit delays

Telegram places retry_after inside parameters, not at the top level.
Read that value and defer long waits to the delivery queue.

* fix(telegram): report unreadable send results

An unreadable successful response may already have sent the message.
Report an explicit uncertain result instead of retrying a create
without an idempotency key or pretending it succeeded.

* fix(telegram): keep editable messages as text

Guessing photo versus text from message content makes later edits
use the wrong API and a smaller caption budget. Always send text
and use the avatar as a link preview.

* fix(telegram): render hard breaks as newlines

Telegram HTML does not support br tags. Render Markdown hard breaks
as plain newlines so otherwise valid messages are accepted.

* fix(telegram): clamp visible html characters

Telegram counts visible characters, not HTML source bytes.
Truncate without splitting tags, entities or surrogate pairs.

* fix(telegram): honor the author emoji toggle

The author marker must obey the group emoji preference just like
formatter-added decoration.

* fix(telegram): keep completed commands claimed

Redelivery after a completed write must never post another comment.
Keep completion claims despite reply failures, scope updates per bot
and only issue account-login links in private chats.

* fix(feishu): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(feishu): classify retryable api failures

Business error codes can be transient even in HTTP 200 responses.
Classify token and rate-limit errors for retry and defer long waits.

* fix(feishu): retry sends with stable uuids

An unreadable response does not prove a send failed.
Reuse the same uuid for retries so recovering the result cannot
create a second Feishu message.

* fix(feishu): refresh and evict tokens safely

Separate app token caches, stop reusing refused tokens and share
refreshes. Cache failures briefly and keep valid tokens in memory
when a best-effort KV cache write fails.

* fix(feishu): use the card update endpoint

Delayed card updates use the card update endpoint; the config
endpoint cannot update an interaction response.

* fix(feishu): neutralize untrusted mentions

Forge text is untrusted and can contain at-all tags.
Neutralize mentions in card bodies and footers before rendering.

* fix(feishu): authenticate and dedupe callbacks

Authenticate signed or token-verified callbacks before dispatching
commands. Decode encrypted envelopes and handle card actions using
the correct fields without claiming irrelevant chat events.

* fix(target): normalize actual destinations

Different target spellings can name the same actual destination.
Normalize channel, thread and topic identities for ownership checks
and per-route duplicate suppression.

* fix(config): transact per-group configuration

Whole-table writes and cached snapshots can overwrite other groups
or resurrect removed configuration. Use per-group guarded writes,
one-time identity migration and explicit unreadable-row failures.

* fix(group): preserve identity through lifecycle

Group names are mutable and reusable, so they cannot own durable
state. Preserve immutable identities across lifecycle operations and
commit invite use with membership under transaction-time guards.

* fix(oauth): confirm account links and installs

A login link or installation id is not proof of account ownership.
Verify installation management, bind browser state and require an
explicit account-link confirmation before granting chat access.

* fix(queue): fence leases and record target outcomes

Retries must remember completed targets and distinguish active
lease holders. Fence state updates, preserve permanent outcomes and
reject missing parked payloads instead of dispatching empty data.

* fix(dispatch): isolate and resume tenant sends

Check tenant sources before filters and never dispatch orphan routes.
Record each target outcome, isolate update chains by forge and group
identity, and keep stale events from overwriting newer messages.

* fix(queue): bound batches and resume deliveries

A queue invocation has shared query and subrequest limits.
Use a small batch and shared send budget, renew fenced leases and
resume only unfinished work without exhausting unstarted messages.

* fix(admin): guard revisions and tenant targets

Read-time authorization alone cannot protect concurrent edits.
Guard revisions, current roles and destination ownership in the
write transaction, and use per-group endpoints for isolated changes.

* fix(webhook): confirm only accepted deliveries

Acknowledging before queue acceptance permanently loses deliveries.
Confirm only accepted work, release failed claims, scope replay
identities and strip tenant-supplied installation authority.

* fix(storage): prune abandoned parked payloads

Oversized payloads can remain after interrupted enqueue attempts.
Prune objects beyond their retry lifetime without deleting payloads
that a current delivery may still need.

* fix(console): expose api conflict statuses

Callers need the HTTP status to distinguish stale edits from other
failures and reload current data after a conflict.

* refactor(console): model group revisions

Carry server revisions explicitly so console writes can reject
changes based on an outdated group snapshot.

* fix(console): send loaded route revisions

Send the revision actually loaded with the route list and adopt the
server response after a save. Reload on conflict instead of silently
overwriting another editor.

* fix(console): guard fragment saves by revision

Fragments share a group version with other configuration writes.
Submit the loaded revision and reload on conflict to preserve
concurrent edits.

* fix(console): save groups with guarded writes

Whole-list saves can overwrite unrelated groups. Use per-group
revision-aware writes, retain rename results and confirm deletion
on the exact group, routes and version shown to the user.

* fix(console): reject edits of stale routes

A conflict reload can leave an older route editor open.
Compare its original value before saving so it cannot overwrite
the newly loaded route.

* fix(console): show overview loading failures

Failed overview requests must not look like an empty dashboard or
a successful refresh. Show the reason while retaining prior data.

* fix(console): explain rejected install bindings

Explain why an installation binding was refused instead of silently
returning to the console with no visible outcome.

* fix(console): allow selecting a group named all

The all sentinel collides with a valid group id.
Use a value that cannot be a group id so that group stays selectable.

* fix(console): discard stale log detail responses

An older detail request can finish after a newer selection or close.
Discard it so the dialog never shows the previously clicked record.

* fix(console): retain legacy group owners

Groups predating member roles store owners in adminIds.
Load those as owners so adding a member never drops all old owners.

* fix(console): lock member edits during saves

Edits made during a save are overwritten by its result.
Disable member controls and guard handlers until the write settles.

* fix(console): show invite loading failures

Failed invite loads must not look like no pending invites.
Show the error and discard responses from a previously shown group.

* fix(console): retain legacy discord log targets

A stored log target without platform means Discord.
Keep that meaning in the editor instead of clearing the target.

* fix(console): retain undisplayed forge sources

An editor that only displays some providers must preserve the others.
Keep stored custom sources when saving unrelated group settings.

* fix(console): lock the group editor while saving

Prevent edits while a group save is in flight and make super-only
installation settings readonly instead of silently ignoring edits.

* fix(console): lock route edits and show failures

Lock the route editor while saving and show fragment load failures
with a retry action rather than presenting a false empty list.

* fix(config): expose the legal contact override

Declare the public runtime key so the documented environment
override reaches legal pages in deployed Nuxt builds.

* build(deploy): migrate d1 before deployment

Apply pending D1 migrations before deploying code that requires
them. Stop deployment when migration fails instead of running
against an incomplete schema.

* docs(worker): align guides with runtime behavior

Synchronize both language guides, API references and examples with
the implemented authorization, storage and delivery behavior.
Document migration requirements and accepted operational limits.

* fix(storage): repair orphaned KV routes

Repair orphaned KV routes before serving KV-only configuration.

* fix(security): fully escape forge HTML

---------

Co-authored-by: RhenCloud <i@rhen.cloud>
2026-10-24 16:19:06 +08:00

456 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript
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import { log } from "../../lib/log";
import {
getOAuthURL,
commentAsUser,
mergePullRequestAsUser,
closePullRequestAsUser,
BeforeGitHubError,
CommandTakenError,
githubRefused,
} from "../../github/oauth";
import { getTelegramLink, unlinkAsCommand } from "../../github/store";
import { acceptedKey, claimOnce, confirmClaim, idempotencyStore } from "../../lib/idempotency";
import type { Env } from "../../types";
import { sendMessage } from "./rest";
import { telegramWebhookSecret } from "./secret";
// github.com itself only (never e.g. `evilgithub.com`): actions hit the GitHub API.
/** An update is held this long while its command runs (then a redelivery may take it). */
const COMMAND_CLAIM_SECONDS = 300;
/** Handled updates are remembered this long. */
const COMMAND_DONE_SECONDS = 86400;
const GITHUB_ISSUE_RE =
/^https?:\/\/(?:www\.)?github\.com\/([^/\s]+)\/([^/\s]+)\/(?:issues|pull)\/(\d+)/;
const GITHUB_PR_RE = /^https?:\/\/(?:www\.)?github\.com\/([^/\s]+)\/([^/\s]+)\/pull\/(\d+)/;
interface TelegramMessage {
message_id?: number;
text?: string;
from?: { id?: number; first_name?: string; username?: string };
chat?: { id?: number; type?: string; title?: string };
date?: number;
message_thread_id?: number;
entities?: Array<{ type?: string; url?: string; offset?: number; length?: number }>;
reply_to_message?: TelegramMessage;
}
let knownBotUsername: { token: string; name: string } | null = null;
/** This bot's username (lower case), from `getMe`; remembered per isolate. */
async function botUsername(env: Env): Promise<string> {
const token = env.TELEGRAM_TOKEN ?? "";
if (knownBotUsername?.token === token) return knownBotUsername.name;
const res = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/getMe`, {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000),
});
const data = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as {
result?: { username?: string };
} | null;
const name = data?.result?.username;
// Unknown: thrown, so Telegram redelivers the update rather than the
// command being dropped.
if (!res.ok || !name) throw new Error(`Telegram getMe failed (HTTP ${res.status})`);
knownBotUsername = { token, name: name.toLowerCase() };
return knownBotUsername.name;
}
interface Target {
owner: string;
repo: string;
number: number;
}
function chatIdOf(msg: TelegramMessage): string | null {
return msg.chat?.id != null ? String(msg.chat.id) : null;
}
function userIdOf(msg: TelegramMessage): string | null {
return msg.from?.id != null ? String(msg.from.id) : null;
}
/** Extract a GitHub issue/PR link from a message (entities text_link or raw text). */
function extractTarget(msg: TelegramMessage, prOnly = false): Target | null {
const urls: string[] = [];
for (const ent of msg.entities ?? []) {
if (ent.type === "text_link" && ent.url) urls.push(ent.url);
}
if (msg.text) {
for (const u of msg.text.match(/https?:\/\/github\.com\/[^\s]+/g) ?? []) urls.push(u);
}
for (const url of urls) {
const re = prOnly ? GITHUB_PR_RE : GITHUB_ISSUE_RE;
const m = url.match(re);
if (m && m[1] && m[2] && m[3]) return { owner: m[1], repo: m[2], number: Number(m[3]) };
}
return null;
}
/**
* Send a reply. One that could not be sent for now throws, so the update is
* redelivered rather than confirmed unanswered (a login link never sent);
* a refusal that a retry cannot change (e.g. the bot was blocked) is logged.
*/
async function reply(
env: Env,
chatId: string,
topicId: string | undefined,
text: string,
): Promise<void> {
const result = await sendMessage(env.TELEGRAM_TOKEN ?? "", chatId, text, topicId);
if (result.ok) return;
log.warn({ chatId, err: result.error }, "Telegram reply failed");
if (!result.status || result.status >= 500 || result.status === 429) {
throw new Error(`Telegram reply failed: ${result.error ?? "unknown"}`);
}
}
function errText(err: unknown): string {
const t = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (t === "GITHUB_TOKEN_EXPIRED") return "GitHub 授权已过期或无效,请重新使用 /gh login 绑定。";
if (t === "GITHUB_FORBIDDEN") return "GitHub 拒绝了此操作:你的账号没有权限。";
if (t === "GITHUB_NOT_FOUND") return "找不到目标(可能已删除或仓库不可访问)。";
return `操作失败:${t}`;
}
async function cmdLogin(env: Env, msg: TelegramMessage): Promise<void> {
const chatId = chatIdOf(msg);
const telegramUserId = userIdOf(msg);
if (!chatId || !telegramUserId) return;
const topicId = msg.message_thread_id != null ? String(msg.message_thread_id) : undefined;
// An authorization link posted in a group can be opened by anyone there;
// binding happens in the private chat with the bot only.
if (msg.chat?.type !== "private") {
return reply(env, chatId, topicId, "请私聊机器人发送 /gh login 绑定 GitHub 账号。");
}
const clientId = env.GITHUB_CLIENT_ID;
if (!clientId)
return reply(env, chatId, topicId, "服务器未配置 GitHub OAuth(GITHUB_CLIENT_ID)。");
const name = msg.from?.username ? `@${msg.from.username}` : msg.from?.first_name;
const state = crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, "");
await env.KV.put(
`state:${state}`,
JSON.stringify({
redirectTo: "/",
link: { platform: "telegram", userId: telegramUserId, name, chatId },
expiresAt: Date.now() + 600_000,
}),
{ expirationTtl: 600 },
);
const url = getOAuthURL(clientId, state);
await reply(
env,
chatId,
topicId,
`点击链接授权 GitHub,即可用<b>本人身份</b>评论(10 分钟内有效):\n${url}`,
);
}
async function cmdLogout(env: Env, msg: TelegramMessage, run: CommandRun): Promise<void> {
const chatId = chatIdOf(msg);
const telegramUserId = userIdOf(msg);
if (!chatId || !telegramUserId) return;
const topicId = msg.message_thread_id != null ? String(msg.message_thread_id) : undefined;
await unlinkAsCommand(env, "telegram", telegramUserId, run.done);
// Done from here: should the reply fail, a redelivery must not unlink again
// (by then it could remove a link made since).
run.acted = true;
await reply(env, chatId, topicId, "已解绑你的 GitHub 账号。");
}
/** Tracks whether a command reached GitHub, so a failed run knows if it may be retried. */
interface CommandRun {
acted: boolean;
/** Records the command as done right before its GitHub write. */
beforeWrite?: () => Promise<void>;
/** This run wrote the "done" (only then may it give it back). */
markedDone?: boolean;
/** The command's "done" record, for writes committed together with it. */
done?: { key: string; ttl: number };
}
async function cmdComment(
env: Env,
msg: TelegramMessage,
body: string,
run: CommandRun,
): Promise<void> {
const chatId = chatIdOf(msg);
const telegramUserId = userIdOf(msg);
if (!chatId || !telegramUserId) return;
const topicId = msg.message_thread_id != null ? String(msg.message_thread_id) : undefined;
const githubUserId = await getTelegramLink(env.DB, telegramUserId);
if (!githubUserId) {
return reply(env, chatId, topicId, "你还没有绑定 GitHub 账号,请先使用 /gh login。");
}
const source = msg.reply_to_message;
const target = source ? extractTarget(source) : null;
if (!target) {
return reply(
env,
chatId,
topicId,
"找不到 issue / PR 链接,请在对应的 GitHub 通知消息上回复 /gh comment。",
);
}
try {
const { htmlUrl, login } = await commentAsUser(
env,
githubUserId,
target.owner,
target.repo,
target.number,
body,
{ beforeWrite: run.beforeWrite },
);
run.acted = true;
await reply(env, chatId, topicId, `已以 **@${login}** 身份评论:${htmlUrl}`);
} catch (err) {
// Nothing reached GitHub yet: give the update back for a retry.
if (err instanceof BeforeGitHubError) throw err;
// Done, only its reply failed: the update must not run again.
if (run.acted) throw err;
// GitHub was called and may have acted (its answer lost): never run
// again. A refusal did nothing: should its reply fail, the command is
// given back and runs again.
if (!githubRefused(err)) run.acted = true;
await reply(env, chatId, topicId, errText(err));
}
}
async function cmdMergeClose(
env: Env,
msg: TelegramMessage,
op: "merge" | "close",
run: CommandRun,
): Promise<void> {
const chatId = chatIdOf(msg);
const telegramUserId = userIdOf(msg);
if (!chatId || !telegramUserId) return;
const topicId = msg.message_thread_id != null ? String(msg.message_thread_id) : undefined;
const githubUserId = await getTelegramLink(env.DB, telegramUserId);
if (!githubUserId) {
return reply(env, chatId, topicId, "你还没有绑定 GitHub 账号,请先使用 /gh login。");
}
const source = msg.reply_to_message;
const target = source ? extractTarget(source, true) : null;
if (!target) {
return reply(
env,
chatId,
topicId,
"找不到 PR 链接,请在对应的 GitHub PR 通知消息上回复 /gh merge 或 /gh close。",
);
}
try {
if (op === "merge") {
await mergePullRequestAsUser(
env,
githubUserId,
target.owner,
target.repo,
target.number,
undefined,
{
beforeWrite: run.beforeWrite,
},
);
} else {
await closePullRequestAsUser(env, githubUserId, target.owner, target.repo, target.number, {
beforeWrite: run.beforeWrite,
});
}
run.acted = true;
const label = op === "merge" ? "合并" : "关闭";
await reply(
env,
chatId,
topicId,
`✅ 已${label} PR ${target.owner}/${target.repo}#${target.number}`,
);
} catch (err) {
// Nothing reached GitHub yet: give the update back for a retry.
if (err instanceof BeforeGitHubError) throw err;
// Done, only its reply failed: the update must not run again.
if (run.acted) throw err;
// GitHub was called and may have acted (its answer lost): never run
// again. A refusal did nothing: should its reply fail, the command is
// given back and runs again.
if (!githubRefused(err)) run.acted = true;
await reply(env, chatId, topicId, errText(err));
}
}
/** Register the Telegram webhook to point at this worker (called from cron). */
export async function syncTelegramWebhook(env: Env): Promise<void> {
const token = env.TELEGRAM_TOKEN;
if (!token) return;
const baseUrl = env.BASE_URL;
if (!baseUrl) return;
// Always registered with a secret (explicit or derived from the bot token),
// so the webhook endpoint can authenticate every call.
const secret = await telegramWebhookSecret(env);
const registration = {
url: `${baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "")}/telegram/webhook`,
secret_token: secret,
allowed_updates: ["message"],
};
// Registered again only when the registration changed (or once a day, to
// repair a webhook changed elsewhere): this runs every few minutes, and
// each run would otherwise be a subrequest. One KV read per run; a write
// only when it registers.
const digest = [
...new Uint8Array(
await crypto.subtle.digest(
"SHA-256",
new TextEncoder().encode(`${token}|${JSON.stringify(registration)}`),
),
),
]
.slice(0, 12)
.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
.join("");
// One record per bot holding what it is registered with now: switching
// A -> B -> A registers A again (a record per digest would still hold A's).
const marker = `telegram:webhook:${token.split(":")[0]}`;
if ((await env.KV.get(marker).catch(() => null)) === digest) return;
const res = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/setWebhook`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify(registration),
});
if (!res.ok) {
const err = await res.text();
log.error({ status: res.status, err }, "Failed to set Telegram webhook");
return;
}
await env.KV.put(marker, digest, { expirationTtl: 86400 }).catch(() => undefined);
}
/** Handle a single Telegram update (message). Called from the webhook route. */
export async function handleTelegramUpdate(env: Env, update: unknown): Promise<void> {
const message = (update as { message?: TelegramMessage })?.message;
if (!message?.text) return;
// Only leading space goes: a comment's trailing lines are its own.
const text = message.text.replace(/^\s+/, "");
// `/gh@BotName ...` is how group chats address one bot among several: run
// it only when the name is this bot's.
const m = text.match(/^\/gh(?:@(\w+))?(?:\s+|$)(.*)$/s);
if (!m) return;
if (m[1] && m[1].toLowerCase() !== (await botUsername(env))) return;
// Telegram redelivers an update until the webhook answers 200; a command
// that already ran (e.g. its reply failed afterwards) must not run again,
// and one whose run is unconfirmed is retried later, never dropped.
const updateId = (update as { update_id?: number }).update_id;
const claims = idempotencyStore(env.DB, env.KV);
// Update ids count per bot: the key names the bot (the id before the
// token's ":", stable across token changes), so another bot's update with
// the same number is never taken for this one.
const botId = (env.TELEGRAM_TOKEN ?? "").split(":")[0] ?? "";
const claimKey = `bot:telegram:${botId}:${updateId}`;
if (updateId != null) {
// Handled under the key used before bots were told apart (kept one day).
if (await claims.has(acceptedKey(`bot:telegram:${updateId}`))) return;
const state = await claimOnce(claims, claimKey, COMMAND_CLAIM_SECONDS);
if (state === "done") return;
if (state === "pending") throw new Error("Telegram update is already being processed");
}
const rest = (m[2] ?? "").replace(/^\s+/, "");
const sub = rest.split(/\s/, 1)[0] ?? "";
// The comment as written: line breaks and indentation kept (only the
// separator after the subcommand goes — up to its first line break).
const body = rest.slice(sub.length).replace(/^[ \t]*\r?\n?/, "");
const run: CommandRun = { acted: false };
// Done on record before GitHub is written to: should the confirmation
// after it fail, a redelivery still never repeats the write.
if (updateId != null) {
run.done = { key: acceptedKey(claimKey), ttl: COMMAND_DONE_SECONDS };
run.beforeWrite = async (): Promise<void> => {
// Taken: a run that outlived its claim finds another run's "done" here
// and writes nothing.
if (!(await claims.claim(acceptedKey(claimKey), COMMAND_DONE_SECONDS)))
throw new CommandTakenError();
run.markedDone = true;
};
}
try {
await runCommand(env, message, sub, body, text, run);
} catch (err) {
// Finished by another run meanwhile: nothing to give back or repeat.
if (err instanceof CommandTakenError) return;
// Failed before reaching GitHub (e.g. a storage error) or refused by it:
// give the update back (an early "done" too), so Telegram's redelivery
// runs it. After GitHub may have acted, it is done for good — running
// again would repeat the comment / merge.
if (updateId != null) {
if (run.acted) {
// Done for good; a "done" written before the GitHub write needs no
// second write.
if (!run.markedDone) await confirmDone();
} else {
// Only a "done" this run wrote: one another run wrote while this one
// outlived its claim stays.
if (run.markedDone) {
await claims.release(acceptedKey(claimKey)).catch(() => undefined);
}
await claims.release(claimKey).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
throw err;
}
// A "done" already written before the GitHub write needs no second write.
if (updateId != null && !run.markedDone) await confirmDone();
/** Best-effort: unconfirmed, the claim still holds off redeliveries until it expires. */
async function confirmDone(): Promise<void> {
await confirmClaim(claims, claimKey, COMMAND_DONE_SECONDS).catch((err: unknown) =>
log.warn({ err, updateId }, "Failed to confirm a Telegram update"),
);
}
}
async function runCommand(
env: Env,
message: TelegramMessage,
sub: string | undefined,
body: string,
text: string,
run: CommandRun,
): Promise<void> {
switch (sub) {
case "login":
return cmdLogin(env, message);
case "logout":
return cmdLogout(env, message, run);
case "comment":
if (!body.trim()) {
const chatId = chatIdOf(message);
const topicId =
message.message_thread_id != null ? String(message.message_thread_id) : undefined;
if (chatId) await reply(env, chatId, topicId, "请附上评论内容:/gh comment 你的评论");
return;
}
return cmdComment(env, message, body, run);
case "merge":
return cmdMergeClose(env, message, "merge", run);
case "close":
return cmdMergeClose(env, message, "close", run);
default:
log.info({ text }, "Unhandled /gh command from Telegram");
}
}