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WebHooker/docs/zh/guide/ingress.md
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翅膀喵andRhenCloud 978c53eeb3 fix(security): harden webhook delivery pipeline and group storage (#11)
* fix(log): preserve structured error details

Error objects lose their useful details when serialized as plain JSON.
Keep the message, stack and cause in structured log output.

* fix(runtime): bound shared in-flight waits

A canceled request can leave its shared promise pending forever.
Bound joins and coordinate a single replacement so later requests
make progress without multiplying upstream work.

* fix(bot): reject oversized callback bodies

Reject declared oversized bot callbacks before reading their bodies.
This keeps unauthenticated requests from wasting worker resources.

* test(d1): exercise real sqlite transactions

Exercise real foreign keys, transactions and conditional statements
instead of mocks that cannot reproduce lost updates or cascades.

* fix(storage): preserve claims across kv fallback

Only missing tables justify KV fallback; other failures must surface.
Remember fallback writes so migration to D1 cannot forget claims
and replay completed work. Share marker checks without extra writes.

* fix(filter): use isolated linear-time patterns

Backtracking patterns can exhaust worker CPU on untrusted payloads.
Use linear-time matching and separate bounded cache namespaces so
glob and regex entries cannot corrupt each other.

* fix(filter): read each event branch correctly

Deployment and check branches live in event-specific nested fields.
Read those fields and remove only the actual leading ref prefix.

* fix(filter): read only own payload properties

Inherited object properties are not webhook payload data.
Read own properties only so JSONPath cannot traverse prototypes.

* fix(filter): validate executable condition trees

Malformed trees and unsupported patterns must not silently turn an
exclude rule into a pass. Validate the shape and only the patterns
the evaluator actually executes.

* fix(i18n): bound and cache translation loads

Repeated misses and simultaneous override loads spend KV reads for
the same language. Cache confirmed misses and share bounded loads
without caching read failures as missing translations.

* i18n(bot): explain command and account failures

Explain account linking, command failures and skipped delivery
outcomes consistently in both supported languages.

* fix(github): bound and reuse app token fetches

Repeated token exchanges waste requests and JWT work for every event.
Reuse valid installation tokens, share refreshes and back off briefly
after failures while keeping every shared wait bounded.

* fix(github): restrict enrichment request urls

Webhook-provided URLs must never receive an installation token on
another host. Restrict enrichment to GitHub repository API paths,
reject redirects and bound optional requests.

* fix(formatter): preserve invalid code points

Out-of-range numeric entities can throw while formatting a delivery.
Keep invalid code points verbatim instead of aborting the message.

* fix(formatter): preserve bounded markdown text

Code spans, fences, indentation and autolinks are Markdown content,
not HTML tags to strip. Preserve them while bounding cleanup input
and reusing results across routes for the same event.

* fix(formatter): strip only leading ref prefixes

A short branch or tag may itself contain refs/heads or refs/tags.
Strip one leading full-ref prefix at the caller and keep short names
unchanged when generating labels and links.

* fix(gitea): link push authors to their forge

A Gitea author is not the same-named GitHub account.
Build author profile links from the originating forge.

* fix(formatter): render deployment state values

The deployment status object stringifies as [object Object].
Render its actual state in the status field.

* fix(formatter): read security severity levels

The scanner severity is not the security severity of an alert.
Prefer the security level so critical and high alerts get the right
label and color.

* fix(formatter): hide actions on other forges

Action buttons call the GitHub API as the linked user.
Hide them for other forges to avoid operating on a same-named
GitHub repository.

* fix(check): isolate updates by check suite

Same-named checks from different suites must not edit one message.
Include the suite or app identity and retain the former key for
controlled adoption of existing tracked messages.

* fix(logs): scope queries before limiting results

Filter authorized groups in SQL before LIMIT and aggregate only
visible rows. Preserve current group attribution for late writes,
surface read failures and combine related totals in one scan.

* perf(d1): index pruning and failed send queries

Pruning and failure views should not scan all historical rows.
Index the high-value access paths without adding a write-heavy
index for infrequent delivery-detail lookups.

* fix(discord): bound individual api requests

An unbounded API request can outlive an update-chain lock.
Bound each request so another holder cannot race a late edit.

* fix(discord): defer long rate-limit waits

Long rate-limit sleeps block delivery progress inside a worker.
Return a retryable 429 for the queue when the wait exceeds the bound.

* fix(discord): encode channel path segments

Stored channel and message ids are path segments, not URL paths.
Encode them so aliases cannot address another Discord resource.

* fix(discord): reuse nonces after lost responses

A successful create may lose its response. Reuse a stable nonce
with enforce_nonce so retries recover that message instead of
posting duplicates or accepting an unreadable success.

* fix(discord): constrain embeds and role mentions

Respect combined embed and component limits as well as field caps.
Restrict allowed mentions to validated route roles so payload text
cannot notify everyone.

* fix(discord): resume bounded command syncs

Application changes, command rollbacks and large guild lists can
leave commands stale indefinitely. Track the current hash per app
and resume bounded paginated work without needless KV writes.

* fix(github): verify installation management

An installation id is user-controlled, and repository access is not
installation management. Verify the owning account or an active
organization admin using the user token and read:org scope.

* fix(github): resolve immutable member ids

A login can be renamed and reclaimed before its first sign-in.
Resolve the current immutable user id when membership is granted
so a future holder of the login cannot inherit access.

* fix(auth): revoke stale sessions and tokens

Revoked or rotated credentials must stop working despite stale KV
replicas. Track the live token and revocations in D1 and preserve
immutable identity bindings rather than trusting a recycled login.

* fix(auth): bind sessions and tokens to identity

Automatic retries can repeat non-idempotent user actions.
Disable those retries and expose a write hook so bot handlers can
record completion immediately before the GitHub write.

* fix(discord): defer and deduplicate interactions

Acknowledge slow actions before Discord times out and deduplicate
interaction writes. Preserve comment text and reject edits whose
source changed after the modal opened.

* fix(telegram): always verify webhook secrets

Webhook verification must not silently disable itself when the
optional secret is absent. Derive a stable secret from the bot
token and reject callbacks when verification is unavailable.

* fix(telegram): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(telegram): honor nested rate-limit delays

Telegram places retry_after inside parameters, not at the top level.
Read that value and defer long waits to the delivery queue.

* fix(telegram): report unreadable send results

An unreadable successful response may already have sent the message.
Report an explicit uncertain result instead of retrying a create
without an idempotency key or pretending it succeeded.

* fix(telegram): keep editable messages as text

Guessing photo versus text from message content makes later edits
use the wrong API and a smaller caption budget. Always send text
and use the avatar as a link preview.

* fix(telegram): render hard breaks as newlines

Telegram HTML does not support br tags. Render Markdown hard breaks
as plain newlines so otherwise valid messages are accepted.

* fix(telegram): clamp visible html characters

Telegram counts visible characters, not HTML source bytes.
Truncate without splitting tags, entities or surrogate pairs.

* fix(telegram): honor the author emoji toggle

The author marker must obey the group emoji preference just like
formatter-added decoration.

* fix(telegram): keep completed commands claimed

Redelivery after a completed write must never post another comment.
Keep completion claims despite reply failures, scope updates per bot
and only issue account-login links in private chats.

* fix(feishu): bound individual api requests

Bound individual platform calls so they cannot outlive the lock
protecting a message update or stall a whole delivery invocation.

* fix(feishu): classify retryable api failures

Business error codes can be transient even in HTTP 200 responses.
Classify token and rate-limit errors for retry and defer long waits.

* fix(feishu): retry sends with stable uuids

An unreadable response does not prove a send failed.
Reuse the same uuid for retries so recovering the result cannot
create a second Feishu message.

* fix(feishu): refresh and evict tokens safely

Separate app token caches, stop reusing refused tokens and share
refreshes. Cache failures briefly and keep valid tokens in memory
when a best-effort KV cache write fails.

* fix(feishu): use the card update endpoint

Delayed card updates use the card update endpoint; the config
endpoint cannot update an interaction response.

* fix(feishu): neutralize untrusted mentions

Forge text is untrusted and can contain at-all tags.
Neutralize mentions in card bodies and footers before rendering.

* fix(feishu): authenticate and dedupe callbacks

Authenticate signed or token-verified callbacks before dispatching
commands. Decode encrypted envelopes and handle card actions using
the correct fields without claiming irrelevant chat events.

* fix(target): normalize actual destinations

Different target spellings can name the same actual destination.
Normalize channel, thread and topic identities for ownership checks
and per-route duplicate suppression.

* fix(config): transact per-group configuration

Whole-table writes and cached snapshots can overwrite other groups
or resurrect removed configuration. Use per-group guarded writes,
one-time identity migration and explicit unreadable-row failures.

* fix(group): preserve identity through lifecycle

Group names are mutable and reusable, so they cannot own durable
state. Preserve immutable identities across lifecycle operations and
commit invite use with membership under transaction-time guards.

* fix(oauth): confirm account links and installs

A login link or installation id is not proof of account ownership.
Verify installation management, bind browser state and require an
explicit account-link confirmation before granting chat access.

* fix(queue): fence leases and record target outcomes

Retries must remember completed targets and distinguish active
lease holders. Fence state updates, preserve permanent outcomes and
reject missing parked payloads instead of dispatching empty data.

* fix(dispatch): isolate and resume tenant sends

Check tenant sources before filters and never dispatch orphan routes.
Record each target outcome, isolate update chains by forge and group
identity, and keep stale events from overwriting newer messages.

* fix(queue): bound batches and resume deliveries

A queue invocation has shared query and subrequest limits.
Use a small batch and shared send budget, renew fenced leases and
resume only unfinished work without exhausting unstarted messages.

* fix(admin): guard revisions and tenant targets

Read-time authorization alone cannot protect concurrent edits.
Guard revisions, current roles and destination ownership in the
write transaction, and use per-group endpoints for isolated changes.

* fix(webhook): confirm only accepted deliveries

Acknowledging before queue acceptance permanently loses deliveries.
Confirm only accepted work, release failed claims, scope replay
identities and strip tenant-supplied installation authority.

* fix(storage): prune abandoned parked payloads

Oversized payloads can remain after interrupted enqueue attempts.
Prune objects beyond their retry lifetime without deleting payloads
that a current delivery may still need.

* fix(console): expose api conflict statuses

Callers need the HTTP status to distinguish stale edits from other
failures and reload current data after a conflict.

* refactor(console): model group revisions

Carry server revisions explicitly so console writes can reject
changes based on an outdated group snapshot.

* fix(console): send loaded route revisions

Send the revision actually loaded with the route list and adopt the
server response after a save. Reload on conflict instead of silently
overwriting another editor.

* fix(console): guard fragment saves by revision

Fragments share a group version with other configuration writes.
Submit the loaded revision and reload on conflict to preserve
concurrent edits.

* fix(console): save groups with guarded writes

Whole-list saves can overwrite unrelated groups. Use per-group
revision-aware writes, retain rename results and confirm deletion
on the exact group, routes and version shown to the user.

* fix(console): reject edits of stale routes

A conflict reload can leave an older route editor open.
Compare its original value before saving so it cannot overwrite
the newly loaded route.

* fix(console): show overview loading failures

Failed overview requests must not look like an empty dashboard or
a successful refresh. Show the reason while retaining prior data.

* fix(console): explain rejected install bindings

Explain why an installation binding was refused instead of silently
returning to the console with no visible outcome.

* fix(console): allow selecting a group named all

The all sentinel collides with a valid group id.
Use a value that cannot be a group id so that group stays selectable.

* fix(console): discard stale log detail responses

An older detail request can finish after a newer selection or close.
Discard it so the dialog never shows the previously clicked record.

* fix(console): retain legacy group owners

Groups predating member roles store owners in adminIds.
Load those as owners so adding a member never drops all old owners.

* fix(console): lock member edits during saves

Edits made during a save are overwritten by its result.
Disable member controls and guard handlers until the write settles.

* fix(console): show invite loading failures

Failed invite loads must not look like no pending invites.
Show the error and discard responses from a previously shown group.

* fix(console): retain legacy discord log targets

A stored log target without platform means Discord.
Keep that meaning in the editor instead of clearing the target.

* fix(console): retain undisplayed forge sources

An editor that only displays some providers must preserve the others.
Keep stored custom sources when saving unrelated group settings.

* fix(console): lock the group editor while saving

Prevent edits while a group save is in flight and make super-only
installation settings readonly instead of silently ignoring edits.

* fix(console): lock route edits and show failures

Lock the route editor while saving and show fragment load failures
with a retry action rather than presenting a false empty list.

* fix(config): expose the legal contact override

Declare the public runtime key so the documented environment
override reaches legal pages in deployed Nuxt builds.

* build(deploy): migrate d1 before deployment

Apply pending D1 migrations before deploying code that requires
them. Stop deployment when migration fails instead of running
against an incomplete schema.

* docs(worker): align guides with runtime behavior

Synchronize both language guides, API references and examples with
the implemented authorization, storage and delivery behavior.
Document migration requirements and accepted operational limits.

* fix(storage): repair orphaned KV routes

Repair orphaned KV routes before serving KV-only configuration.

* fix(security): fully escape forge HTML

---------

Co-authored-by: RhenCloud <i@rhen.cloud>
2026-10-24 16:19:06 +08:00

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# Webhook 接入与租户隔离
## Webhook 提供方
WebHooker 通过同一个 `POST /webhook` 端点接收多个 forge 的 webhook,按请求头自动识别来源;只需把各 forge 的 webhook 指向 `{BASE_URL}/webhook` 即可。
| 提供方 | 事件请求头 | 签名请求头 | 签名格式 | 密钥 |
| ------ | ---------------- | --------------------- | -------------------------- | ----------------------- |
| GitHub | `X-GitHub-Event` | `X-Hub-Signature-256` | `sha256=<hex>` HMAC-SHA256 | `GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET` |
| Gitea | `X-Gitea-Event` | `X-Gitea-Signature` | 纯 hex HMAC-SHA256 | `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` |
投递 id 去重使用 `X-GitHub-Delivery`(GitHub)或 `X-Gitea-Delivery`(Gitea)请求头(存在时)。
启用投递队列时,webhook 只有在持久入队后才返回 `200`。若队列拒收,端点返回 `503` 并释放去重占用,发送方的重投会被接受,而不会被当作重复丢弃。已被接受的 webhook 再次投递时返回 `200 { "duplicate": true }`;第一份仍在处理中时到达的重投返回 `503`,由发送方稍后重试。
未绑定队列时,webhook 内联分发,分发结束后才应答:所有目标都处理完返回 `200`,有目标暂时失败时返回 `503`(发送方重投时会跳过已成功的目标)。内联分发最多发送 8 分钟,其余目标返回 `503`,避免单个请求超过其去重占用的有效期。
Gitea 载荷会被归一化为与 GitHub 事件相同的内部结构,因此路由、过滤器与 28 个格式化器无需改动即可工作。未知或未映射的 Gitea 事件回退到通用格式化器。仓库/提交/用户链接取自载荷中的 `repository.html_url`,因此指向你的 Gitea 实例。
## 全局端点(`POST /webhook`)
全局端点使用运营者的全局密钥(`GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET`、`GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET`)验签,并分发到**所有**路由——未绑定来源的[隔离分组](./groups#自助注册)除外。GitHub App 安装的事件都在此送达;在分组上设置 `installationId` 可保持租户隔离。
## 分组端点(`POST /webhook/{groupId}`)
每个分组都可以选择接入自己的 webhook 入口,使用独立的密钥(在分组页面的 _Webhook 端点_ 面板生成,owner 角色)。载荷使用**分组**的密钥验签,而不是全局密钥,并且只有该分组的路由会被触发。SaaS 用户以此配置 Gitea、经典 GitHub 或自定义 webhook,而无需共享(或知道)运营者的密钥。
- 支持任意提供方:GitHub(`X-Hub-Signature-256`)、Gitea(`X-Gitea-Signature`)、自定义(`X-WebHooker-Signature`)
- 密钥为 64 位 hex 字符串,与分组一起存于 D1(生成之后不再发给控制台);重新生成会立即失效旧密钥,只有当前 owner 能轮换或删除
- 投递 id 去重键按提供方与租户隔离(`delivery:{provider}:@i:{instance}:{id}`——使用分组不可变的 instance,改名不改变作用域,以同一 id 新建的分组也不会共用;全局入口使用作用域 `@global`)
- 租户签名的载荷只具备租户本身的可信度:其中的 `installation.id` 会被忽略,因此它不会使用运营者的 GitHub App 凭据(不做 job/构建日志补全),也不会创建或重新绑定安装分组;分组自身入口的事件不受安装限制约束
- 分组没有密钥(或已不存在)时端点返回 `404`;分组存储的配置无法读取时返回 `503`
## 自定义 Webhook
向 `POST /webhook/{groupId}`(或全局端点)POST 一个 JSON 对象,并使用分组密钥将原始 body 的 HMAC-SHA256 以 `X-WebHooker-Signature: sha256=<hex>` 签名(顶层为数组或标量时返回 `400`)。载荷会变成 `custom` 事件,走正常的路由管线——创建一条 `event: custom` 的路由(控制台有模板),即可分发到该路由的目标、记录 `send_logs`,并出现在分组的 webhook 日志频道中。
### 重放防护
自定义 webhook 支持可选的防重放机制,在签名之外再附带两个请求头:
- `X-WebHooker-Timestamp` — 请求发送时的 Unix 秒数
- `X-WebHooker-Nonce` — 每次请求唯一且不可预测的值(如 UUID)
当**同时**提供这两个请求头时,签名改为对 `{timestamp}.{nonce}.{原始body}` 计算(而非仅原始 body),且仅当以下条件满足时才被接受:
1. 时间戳与服务器时钟相差不超过 ±5 分钟(拒绝重放与时钟漂移滥用)
2. 该 nonce 对此密钥从未被使用过(原子占用并保留 10 分钟;重放的 nonce 会被拒绝,其他租户可以使用相同 nonce)。第一次请求仍在处理中的 nonce,或 nonce 存储故障,返回 `503` 而不是 `401`,由发送方重试
```bash
input="${timestamp}.${nonce}.${body}"
signature="sha256=$(printf '%s' "$input" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$secret" -hex | sed 's/.*= //')"
```
省略这些请求头时,WebHooker 回退到旧版的仅对 body 签名,现有发送方无需改动即可继续工作。
载荷模式:
```json
{
"title": "Deploy failed",
"description": "Prod rollout failed at 12:03 UTC",
"color": "red",
"url": "https://ci.example.com/runs/42",
"repo": "acme/widget",
"author": {
"name": "alice",
"iconUrl": "https://…/alice.png",
"url": "https://github.com/alice"
},
"fields": [{ "name": "Env", "value": "prod", "inline": true }],
"footer": "my-monitor",
"deliveryId": "alert-123"
}
```
| 字段 | 类型 | 说明 |
| ------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `title` | string | 消息标题(缺省时为 "Custom message") |
| `description` | string | 可选消息正文 |
| `color` | string | 可选嵌入颜色:颜色词(`red`、`green`、`yellow`、`blue`、`purple`、`orange`、`cyan`、`gray`)或 `#rrggbb` |
| `url` | string | 可选的标题链接 |
| `repo` | string | 可选 `owner/repo`;作为标题前缀并用作页脚 |
| `author` | object | 可选 `{ name, iconUrl, url }` |
| `fields` | object[] | 可选嵌入字段 `{ name, value, inline }` |
| `footer` | string | 可选页脚覆盖 |
| `deliveryId` | string | 可选的发送方去重 id(重试)。没有 `deliveryId` 时以 nonce 标识请求;两者都没有时,重试的请求会被再次投递 |
## GitHub App 租户隔离
GitHub App 安装后,**所有**安装方的事件都会到达全局端点。要让租户互相隔离,请把每个分组绑定到应当为其提供事件的安装 ID:`"installationId": 12345678`。该 ID 可从 App 安装 webhook 载荷(`installation.id`)或 GitHub App 安装页 URL 看到。即使分组的 `owners` 为空,来自其它安装的事件也会被拒绝。未设置 `installationId` 的分组保持旧行为(`owners` 过滤)。
绑定是**自动配置**的 —— 将 GitHub App 的 _Setup URL_ 指向 `{BASE_URL}/auth/github/install`。用户安装 App 后浏览器立即跳转到该页面(页面需要已登录的管理员会话——未登录用户会先被重定向走 OAuth 流程),可选择将安装绑定到:**新分组**(`inst-{installationId}`,默认)或任意**自己拥有 owner 权限的已有分组**(提交时再次校验角色;由 `POST /auth/github/install/bind` 完成配置)。无需手动填写 ID。Setup URL 中的 `installation_id` 可以被随意填写,因此页面与绑定步骤都会先用登录用户本人的 GitHub token 验证其有权管理该安装:用户就是安装所属账号,或是其组织的有效**管理员**(仅以协作者身份能访问该安装并不够)。否则会带 `?error=install-forbidden` 返回。超级管理员可以绑定任意安装。开启 `ALLOW_SELF_SIGNUP` 时,只有当专用的 `inst-{installationId}` 分组仍绑定该安装且尚无任何成员时,安装者才会成为其 owner——其他分组绝不会以这种方式交给新 owner。以 `inst-` 或 `u-` 开头的 id 为这些系统分组保留:只有超级管理员能创建或重命名为此类 id,已存在但未绑定的 `inst-*` 分组也不会被自动绑定。
作为兜底(例如未配置 Setup URL 时),`installation.created` webhook 事件(仅限全局入口)也会自动创建/绑定分组 —— `owners` 匹配安装账号的现有分组会被绑定,否则创建独立的 `inst-{installationId}` 分组。之后在控制台为分组添加路由和成员即可。自动配置在该投递完成去重检查之后执行,并按安装、按已绑定分组各记录 7 天,因此重投的事件不会重新绑定超级管理员已解除绑定的分组;配置失败时端点返回 `503`,让事件被重新投递。
要在选择页显示安装所属账号的登录名,请设置 `GITHUB_APP_ID` 与 `GITHUB_PRIVATE_KEY`——见[密钥](./configuration#密钥)。